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INTRODUCTION
[Ilt does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or
no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.'
whether a
Situations will arise where it will be difficult to determine
2
particular activity is religious or purely commercial.
Any activity engaged in by a church as a body is an exercise of religion.3
People will do some odd things for political or religious reasons, but
that's nothing compared to what people will do for a buck.4

How seriously do we take the consequences of broad religious liberty exemptions? Should religious actors be exempt, for
example, from generally applicable debtor-creditor or housing
discrimination laws? As a matter of intuition, most of us would
say "no." Among other functions, such laws protect discrete individuals from violations of "private rights." Thus, even proponents of the strongest protection for religious liberty typically
agree that religious liberty should be protected "'in every case
1. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 159 (William
Peden ed., 1972), quoted in Daniel Keating, Bankruptcy, Tithing, and the
Pocket-PickingParadigmof Free Exercise, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 1041, 1041 (internal citation omitted).
2. Murdockv. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110 (1943).
3. Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses:
The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1390 (1981) (footnote omitted).
4. P.J. O'ROURKE, EAT THE RICH 4 (1998).
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where it does not trespass on private rights .... . ,5 Yet, while
this dictum has a long pedigree, 6 and a certain intuitive appeal,
it does not explain what a "private right" is for religious liberty
7
purposes, or why "private rights" should always prevail.
This Article considers these questions in the light of two
recent, controversial cases, In re Young8 and Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission.9 In Young, the United
5. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1128 (1990) (quoting Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822) (internal citation omitted)).
6. As early as June 1776, for example, the Virginia Assembly of Representatives "declared 'that all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of
their religion, or the duty they owe to their Creator, and the manner of discharging it according to the dictates of their consciences.' The Sentiments of
the Several Companies of Militia and Freeholders of Augusta, in Virginia,
Communicated by the Deputies from the Said Companies and Freeholders to
Their Representatives in the General Assembly of the Commonwealth (1776),
in 2 PETER FORCE, AiERICAN ARCHIVES: FIFTH SERIES 816 (1851). In an apparent response, certain Virginians wrote to their representatives in October
1776 to say "[wie take [the foregoing] to be the true and full meaning of their
words, without any unjust view of favouring some to the hurt of others .... "
Id.
7. I acknowledge at the outset that the "private" nature of rights is at
best unclear, and at worst incoherent. A critic might point out that, unless
you believe in natural law, all rights come from the "state," meaning that
there are no "private" rights. As discussed below, I mean only that private
rights protect individuals from "harm." What constitutes "harm" is, itself, a
difficult question, which cannot be fully defined in this Article. Indeed, my
thesis implies that courts should be left to make that determination on a caseby-case basis. The important distinction involves rights typically associated
with the "police" power, on the one hand, and rights typically associated with
discrete individuals, on the other. In exercising its police power, the state
seeks, for its own sake, or the benefit of the diffuse and ill-defined general
public, to prohibit an exercise of religion. See, e.g., John Delaney, Police Power
Absolutism and Nullifying the Free Exercise Clause: A Critique of Oregon v.
Smith, 25 IND.L. REV. 71, 99 (1991) (noting that police power encompasses
the power to "enact laws for the public health, safety and general welfare" (citations omitted)). Laws forbidding polygamy or the ingestion of peyote come to
mind. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (upholding a bigamy conviction against a free exercise challenge); Employment
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-83 (1990) (upholding the denial of unemployment benefits for work-related "misconduct" in using of peyote). Such laws do
not protect identifiable private individuals in any significant sense. As a practical matter, few private individuals would be able to show that such activities
harmed them.
8. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d
1407 (8th Cir. 1996), reh'g en banc denied, 89 F.3d 494 (8th Cir. 1996), cert.
granted, vacated, and remanded, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997), affd 141 F.3d 854 (8th
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 43 (1998).
9. 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999), opinion withdrawn on grant of reh'g by
Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999).
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States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)Io was a defense to a constructive fraudulent conveyance action and thus
precluded a bankruptcy trustee from avoiding and recovering
insolvent religious debtors' otherwise avoidable church contributions. In Thomas, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ni -h Circuit held that a "hybrid rights" theory-a combination
of religious liberty and private property rights under the
United States Constitution-entitled religious landlords to defy
Alaska's fair housing laws and to refuse to rent residential real
estate to unmarried couples.
As of this writing, the opinion in Thomas has been withdrawn, and the case has been scheduled for rehearing en banc
after publication of this Article. One goal of this Article is to
suggest ways that courts (including the Ninth Circuit) can
avoid the problems created by Young and Thomas. Both decisions assume, with little analysis, that making gifts while insolvent and leasing real property, respectively, are exercises of
religion. They come to this conclusion not by independently
analyzing "religious exercise" or the transactions in question,
but instead by deferring to the religious actors' characterization
of the transactions as a religious exercise. Deference of this
depth-I call it "deep deference"-can, in certain cases, be an
appropriate judicial tool for resolving religious liberty disputes.
For example, courts often defer deeply to church polities in
cases involving internal matters of church doctrine, and in
cases that pit religious actors against governmental bodies exercising their police power. 1 Yet, deference to the claim that
an activity is a religious exercise appears to decline as courts
seek to protect third parties from harm.
In Young and Thomas, the harms were fairly clear. There
is little dispute that the Youngs' creditors were entitled, under
well-established constructive fraudulent conveyance principles,
to recover the Youngs' donations, but their private right to repayment was defeated by RFRA. 12 Similarly, in the Thomas
case, unmarried couples in Alaska enjoyed a "private" right to
be free from housing discrimination that was defeated by the
10. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994); see also
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (holding that Congress exceeded its power under the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting RFRA and
therefore RFRA is unconstitutional as it applies to states).
11. See infra Part I.B.
12. See infra Part II.D.1.
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combination of religious liberty and private property rights.' 3
Although Young appears to be settled law within the Eighth
Circuit, the withdrawal of the Thomas opinion creates the opportunity to re-examine judicial strategies for addressing the
harm to third parties caused by religious liberty exemptions.
The problem with Young and Thomas is not their conclusions, but their methods-or, rather, their lack of methods.
They fail to consider carefully whether donating money or
leasing real estate are religious exercises, 14 and they engage in
little or no balancing of competing harms.' 5 A court could, under certain circumstances, conclude that these activities were
religious exercises entitled to protection from the laws in question. It is disturbing, however, to see courts abdicate their responsibility to assess claims and weigh harms independently.
Courts such as Young and Thomas disserve religious actors and
potential third parties alike by deferring deeply in the face of
third-party harm. Deference dilutes the seriousness with
which we expect courts to consider matters as important as religion.
In a larger sense, balancing the rights of religious actors
and third parties reflects the two competing anxieties that have
historically defined the boundaries of our religious liberty jurisprudence. Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence reflects an
anxiety of anarchy, the fear expressed by Justice Scalia in Employment Division v. Smith,16 that broad religious liberty exemptions would court anarchy by permitting individuals to become laws "'unto themselves.'' 7
Establishment Clause
jurisprudence reflects an anxiety of entanglement, the fear first
expressed long ago in Watson v. Jones that civil courts will be
forced to conduct "heresy trials" if they become too deeply involved in deciding religious liberty disputes. 18 These two anxieties-anarchy and entanglement-reflect judicial attempts to
accommodate the many competing values of our religious liberty jurisprudence.' 9 These anxieties create a tension that fos13. See infra Part II.D.2.
14. See infra Part I.D.
15. See infra Part II.D.
16. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
17. Id. at 885 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)).
18. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1871); see also infra text accompanying
notes 53-77.
19. These constitutional values include voluntarism (religious belief
should arise voluntarily, and not as the product of government coercion), see
Note, Toward A ConstitutionalDefinition of Religion, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1056,
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ters ordered liberty. The Young and Thomas decisions degrade
the force of this healthy tension by ignoring it.
Courts-including the Ninth Circuit's Thomas rehearing
panel-can avoid these shortcomings by using principles of equity jurisprudence. Equity, which is "[jiustice administered according to fairness as contrasted with the strictly formulated
rules of common law,"20 is a useful source of substantial justice
in conflicts between claims of religious liberty and third-party
rights, for two reasons. First, equity grants courts expansive
fact-finding powers. With such powers, courts may independently determine whether an activity is a religious exercise.
Second, equity provides a well-established basis for balancing
harms. Balancing harms enables a court to take seriously the
rights of both religious actors and third parties who may be
harmed by their exercise of religion.
Although principles of equity may aid judges seeking to resolve disputes between religious actors and third parties, equity does not tell judges how to set the "scale" in the first place.
Courts could, for example, simply assume that all disputes between religious claimants and third parties are sui generis, to
be resolved as if the scales were evenly set. Alternatively,
courts could recognize a presumption in favor of the religious
claimant, as did the United States Supreme Court in the cases
that granted the broadest religious exemptions, Sherbert v.
Verner 2 ' and Wisconsin v. Yoder. 22 This presumption may be
appropriate when granting a religious liberty exemption would
not result in harm to third parties. But, where third parties
are likely to be harmed by an exemption, courts should not recognize a presumption in favor of religious claimants. In those
cases, courts should carefully consider the balance of harms,
without privileging, ab initio, religion or private rights.

1058 (1978) (noting that "[tihe core of the Free Exercise Clause is voluntarism"), separatism (that government and religion should not intermingle), see,
e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947), and pluralism (that diversity of belief and practice is inherently valuable in a free society), see, e.g.,
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
20. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 484 (5th ed. 1979). See generally infra Part
IILA_
21. 374 U.S. 398, 402, 408-09 (1963) (holding that a Seventh Day Adventist may not be denied unemployment benefits for refusing to work on days of
worship).
22. 406 U.S. 205, 221, 234-36 (1972) (holding the Amish exempt from laws
compelling public school attendance).
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This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I considers the
definitional problem: How, if at all, can courts determine
whether activities that potentially harm third parties are nevertheless religious exercises? Part I focuses on the role that
deference plays in defining religion, and argues that deference
is unsound when defining an activity as a religious exercise
would have the effect of harming third parties. Part II considers the role of balancing harms in religious liberty disputes:
How have courts balanced harms when a religious exemption
would harm third parties? Part II argues that, in eliminating
the judicial duty to balance harms in religious liberty disputes,
Employment Division v. Smith unwittingly created the very
anarchy it sought to avoid. Part III describes ways that equity
jurisprudence can remedy both the problems of defining religion and balancing harms.
I.

DEFINING RELIGION AND THE ANXIETY OF
ENTANGLEMENT

The first half of the problem with Young and Thomas has
to do with definitions: 23 How, if at all, were the activities in
question exercises of "religion?" The cases do not say, except in
the most attenuated sense. They simply defer to the claimants'
claims that renting real estate or making donations while insolvent are religious exercises. Deep deference of this sort is
often an acceptable, perhaps necessary, approach to resolving
religious liberty disputes. Thus, the internal affairs cases discussed below defer deeply for fear of entanglement in doctrinal
matters. Yet deference often follows a continuum that distinguishes harm to individuals from harm to the state. When defining an activity as a "religious exercise" threatens to harm
third parties-rather than dilute the police power of the statethe Supreme Court has usually been far less deferential. Instead, the Court appears to engage in a "transactional analysis," scrutinizing independently the transaction that actually
occurred, notwithstanding the claim that it is a religious exercise.
The First Amendment of the Constitution is the source of
protection for religious liberty, providing that neither federal
nor state governments may make any law "respecting an es23. The second half of the problem is whether-and ifso, how-courts can
balance harms in religious liberty disputes involving third parties. See infra
Part II.
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tablishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."2 4 But the Constitution does not define the operative
terms-"religion," "exercise," or "free. 2 5 Courts 26 and scholars,
legal2 7 and otherwise, 28 have all wrestled with the definitional
problem. 29 To date, there has been little consensus. Instead of
defining religion, courts often focus on the contours of permis24. U.S. CONST. amend I. The First Amendment applies to state law by
"incorporation" into the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut
310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
25. Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the
Free Exercise Clause, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65, 69 (1996) ("The questions of what is
'free exercise,' what is 'religion,' or what is a law 'prohibiting' free exercise,
find no answers in the wording of the (Free Exercise] Clause.").
26. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 173-76 (1965) (defining religion in the context of a conscientious objector provision of a statute
governing military conscription); Dettmer v. Landon, 799 F.2d 929, 932 (4th
Cir. 1986) (assuming arguendo that witchcraft is a religion); Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1036 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that a group described by
its founder as a revolutionary religious organization, does not qualify as a religion for free exercise purposes); Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 199 (3d Cir.
1979) (per curiam) (holding that Transcendental Meditation is a religion for
Establishment Clause purposes).
27. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 14-6 (2d ed. 1988); Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion"in the FirstAmendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579; George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search
for the ConstitutionalDefinition of "Religion,"71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983); Kent
Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in ConstitutionalLaw, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753
(1984); Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarificationof the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233 (1989); Gail Merel, The Protectionof Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion Under the First
Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 805 (1978); Note, Reinterpretingthe Religion
Clauses: ConstitutionalConstruction and Conceptions of the Self, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1468 (1984); Note, supra note 19, at 1083-89.
28. See JOHN CLARK ARCHER, FAITHS MEN LIVE BY 7-16 (1934); Gregory
Baum, Definitionsof Religion in Sociology, in WHAT IS RELIGION? AN ENQUIRY
FOR CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 25 (Mircea Eliade & David Tracy eds., 1980); HANS
MOL, IDENTITY AND THE SACRED at ix-x (1976); ELIZABETH K. NOTTINGHAM,
RELIGION: A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW 6-8 (1971); PAUL TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF
THE FOUNDATIONS 57 (1948) ("He who knows about depth knows about god.").
The problem of defining religion, whether for theological or sociological purposes, is hardly a new one, and has perplexed distinguished thinkers. See
generally AUGUSTE COMTE, A GENERAL VIEW OF POSITIVISM (J. H. Bridges
trans., 1957); JOHN DEWEY, A COMMON FAITH (1934); ERICH FROMM,
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND RELIGION (1950); IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN
THE LIMITS OF REASON ALONE (Theodore M. Greene & Hoyt H. Hudson trans.,
1934); MAX WEBER, THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION (Ephraim Fischoff trans.,
1963).
29. See Val D. Ricks, To God God's, to CaesarCaesar's, and to Both the
Defining of Religion, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1053, 1053 (1993) ("Either the
federal constitutional definition of religion is of vital, continuing interest to the
law, or someone is paying scholars a lot of money to write about it.").
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sible "exercise." Implicitly acknowledging that "free exercise of
religion" embodies a complex, compound right,30 courts began
in 1940 to accept the proposition that religion may not involve
Judeo-Christian concepts of "god"-and may not even be theistic.31 To contain the anarchic effect of such a construction,
courts have focused on "exercise" to find that, in some cases, an
exercise of religion would entitle the claimant to an exemption
from generally applicable laws-but more often, it would not.
A. DEFINITIONAL EXERCISES

Although the Supreme Court has been reluctant to define
religion, it has circled around the issue for over one hundred
years. In Davis v. Beason, for example, the Court upheld an
Idaho law that required electors to swear an oath that they
were not polygamists.3 2 Defending the required oath, Justice
Field explained that "religion' has reference to one's views of
his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose
of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his
will." 33 The Davis definition therefore assumed the existence,
and perhaps the form, of a "creator."34 This understanding also
assumed that the prevailing morality of "all civilized and
35
Christian countries" should control the definition of religion.
By limiting the definition of religion to those recognized as
Christian, the Court was able to prevent the anarchy that it
believed would flow from a broader, more pluralistic definition.
Half a century later, the Court began to expand its definition of religion. In United States v. Ballard,the Court first recognized that the Free Exercise Clause compelled a broader

30. See McConnell, supra note 5, at 1114 ("The conclusion that the [Free
Exercise C]lause protects conduct as well as speech or belief would seem to
follow from its very words: 'exercise' means conduct.").
31. See, e.g., Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166 (interpreting religion in a conscientious objector provision to include ideas other than an orthodox belief in God).
32. 133 U.S. 333, 346-48 (1890); see also Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (upholding a bigamy conviction against a free exercise
challenge).
33. Davis, 133 U.S. at 342.
34. The Framers of the Constitution probably shared similar views.
James Madison, for example, characterized religion as "the duty which we owe
to our creator, and the manner of discharging it." James Madison, Memorial
and Remonstrance on the Religious Rights of Man, in CORNERSTONES OF

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA 84 (J. Blau ed., 1964), quoted in Note, supra
note 19, at 1060 n.26.
35. Davis, 133 U.S. at 341.
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definition of religion than was found in Davis. 36 The Ballard

Court held that the "I Am" faith was entitled to constitutional
protection, reasoning that religion "embraces the right to maintain theories of life and of death and of the hereafter which are
rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths."37 This expansion continued in Torcaso v. Watkins, where the Court struck
down a provision of the Maryland constitution that required officeholders to declare their belief in God.3 8 The Court reasoned
that such a provision favored one category of religions (theistic)
over another (non-theistic) in violation of the Establishment
Clause. 39 For the first time, the Court admitted the existence
of non-theistic religions and extended First Amendment protec40
tion to their adherents.
The broadest definition of religion appeared in the construction of a statute, 4 1 not the Free Exercise Clause. In
United States v. Seeger, the Court held that "religion" included
opposition to war based on "belief in and devotion to goodness
and virtue for their own sakes.'" 42 Drawing on modern theologians like Paul Tillich, the Court reasoned that religion included a "sincere and meaningful belief which occupie[d] in the
life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of
those admittedly qualifying for the exemption." 43
Courts have not been alone in attempting to define religion. Scholars, too, have struggled with the definitional problem. One recent approach 4 suggested that "[religion should be
used for constitutional purposes in the same way that it is used
in everyday language and, further, that its meaning and appli-

36. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944) (describing the diversity of protected religious beliefs).
37. Id. at 86.
38. 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1961) (stating that the government cannot constitutionally force people to profess a religious belief).
39. See id. at 489-90 (noting that the state of Maryland sided with those
who believe in God).
40. See id. at 495 n.11 ("Among religions in this country which do not
teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are
Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others.")
41. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 164 (1965) (citing Universal
Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1958)).
42. Id. at 166 (quoting Seeger's letter to the draft board).
43. Id. at 176; see also id. at 180 (citing 2 PAUL TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC
THEOLOGY 12 (1957)).

44. See Eduardo Pefialver, Note, The Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J.
791, 791-92 (1997).
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cation are readily apparent." 45 A 1978 note in the Harvard
Law Review advocated a functional definition that would treat
"religion" like "speech," and protect the wide range of belief systems that constitute a person's "'ultimate concern.'" 46 Several
scholars have rejected such a broad approach, and have instead
proposed content-based definitions that attempt to capture the
essential character of religion. Professor Jesse Choper, for example, has proposed a definition based upon the presence of a
belief in "'extra-temporal consequences" to human action. 47
Andrew Austin has proposed a definition based upon the presence of "faith."48
Still others suggest a different approach. George Freeman 49 and Kent Greenawalt, 50 have proposed a "methodology"
derived from Wittgenstein's PhilosophicalInvestigations:
Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". [sic] I
mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games and so
on. What is common to them all?-Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games"--but look and see
whether there is anything common to all.-For if you look at them
you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that ....
... [T]he result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall
similarities, sometimes similarities of detail ....

I can think of no

better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances.""'

A "methodology" can also be criticized. Wittgenstein's approach
offers no insight as to what constitutes a "family resemblance"
to religion, or what the baseline activity would be. Nor is it

45. Id. at 791-92. Some have argued that the Framers of the Constitution
shared these assumptions. See ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A
NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 90 (1990).
46. Note, supra note 19, at 1056. But see Choper, supra note 27, at 594-97
(criticizing this premise).
47. Choper, supra note 27, at 597-604.
48. See Andrew W. Austin, Faith and the ConstitutionalDefinition of Religion, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 33-43 (1991-1992).
49. See Freeman, supra note 27, at 1548 (stating that the attempt to define religion is "misconceived" and that there is no characteristic common to
all religions that makes them "religious").
50. See Greenawalt, supra note 27, at 764 (proposing that the determination of a religion should be made by a comparison to that which is "indisputably religious").
51. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 66, at 3132 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 2d ed. 1958).
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clear how a court should "look and see"
whether commonalties
52
exist between one activity and another.
At bottom, it is not clear why a court should take this, or
any other, approach, when courts have frequently deferredsometimes quite deeply-to the claim that an activity is a religious exercise. In other words, why should courts even bother to
define religion if they can instead take claimants at their word?
B. DEFERENCE AS DEFINITION-THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS CASES
Courts and commentators rarely consider the effect that
defining religion has on third parties. But the consequences of
defining religion can be significant. If donating money and
leasing real property are exercises of "religion," then persons
harmed by religious actors engaged in those activities are not
entitled to protection from generally applicable laws regulating
the activities. 53 One definitional strategy is through the socalled "internal affairs" cases. These cases do not independently determine whether a dispute involves matters of religious
import; instead they defer to the claims of the parties, presuming that disputes about, for example, the ownership of
54
church property are in reality doctrinal conflicts.
The deep deference of the internal affairs cases has roots in
Watson v. Jones, an 1871 decision in which the Supreme Court
held as a matter of federal common law that civil courts had no
business making ecclesiastical decisions-they could not conduct "heresy" trials. 55 But the Court has also recognized two

52. See Pefialver, supra note 44, at 815. The author argues that in determining "family resemblances" among religions, judges should develop baselines "us[ing] in their analogical process . . . the existing set of religions in
their diversity of belief and form." Id. at 817. This may help to avoid JudeoChristian bias as currently constructed, but it still begs the questions of what
composes the "existing set" of religions or religious exercise to begin with.
53. This would be so at least in the post-Lochner era, where the state is
unrestricted by notions of "substantive due process." To the extent one believes Lochner is not dead, however, one may well ask whether (or to what extent) the government may regulate commercial activity. See generally Cass R.
Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 883-902 (1987) (arguing
that numerous cases following Lochner rely on "Lochner-like" principles and
that Lochner has not been completely overruled).
54. These cases are often called the "church property cases" because they
frequently involve disputes over the disposition of church property. See generally Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Church Property Disputes: Churches as Secular and
Alien Institutions, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 335, 348-53 (1986) (describing the
Court's deference test as used in the church property cases).
55. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1871) ("The law knows no heresy.").
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limited exceptions to the deference doctrine. Civil courts need
not defer, and could instead delve (at least "marginally") into
matters of religious doctrine, if they either relied on "neutral
principles" in doing so, 5 6 or limited the inquiry to questions of
57
fraud or collusion by the church.
In one sense, deference is no more a method of defining religion than it is a method of resolving internal church disputes.
Indeed, deep deference can be seen as the opposite of a method.
It is judicial passivity. As such, the internal affairs cases form
the most deferential node of the continuum of deference. While
deep deference has been criticized, 58 it is not always inappropriate. Reflecting the anxiety of entanglement, the Supreme
Court has noted more than once that "[tihe determination of
what is a 'religious' belief or practice is more often than not a
difficult and delicate task."59
The delicacy of the definitional task appears to reflect at
least two related concerns, one constitutional, the other institutional. The constitutional concern is the legitimate fear that
the mere act of definition will "establish" a religion, or prefer
one denomination to another.6 0 If, for example, the Davis Court
had the power to hold that polygamy was too outrageous a
56. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979).
57. See Gonzalez v. Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929).
58. See Ingber, supra note 27, at 247-49; Alfred G. Killilea, Standardsfor
Expanding Freedom of Conscience, 34 U. PITT. L. REV. 531, 538-41 (1972);
Mary Harter Mitchell, Secularism in Public Education:The ConstitutionalIssues, 67 B.U. L. REV. 603, 631-33 (1987); Timothy L. Hall, Note, The Sacred
and the Profane: A FirstAmendment Definition of Religion, 61 TEX. L. REV.
139, 160-161 (1982).
59. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indep. Employment See. Div., 450 U.S.
707, 714 (1981); see also United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) ("It is
not within 'the judicial function and judicial competence' ... to determine
whether [the Amish] or the Government has the proper interpretation of the
Amish faith; '[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.'" (quoting
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716)). The Hernandez Court contains a somewhat analogous line of thought, reasoning that "[uit is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of
particular litigants' interpretations of those creeds." Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). The Court echoed this reasoning one year
later. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-87 (1990) ("It is no
more appropriate for judges to determine the 'centrality' of religious beliefs
before applying a 'compelling interest' test in the free exercise field, than it
would be for them to determine the 'importance' of ideas before applying the
'compelling interest' test in the free speech field.").
60. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) ("The clearest
command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.").
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practice to be "a tenet of religion,"6 1 it had, by implication, the
power to do the opposite. Every disestablishment carries the
potential for establishment.
At the institutional level, courts defer because they view
themselves as lacking the expertise to define religion. This is
understandable. 62 Judging the religious experiences of others
cannot be easy. The anxiety of entanglement reflects this
healthy reluctance. Moreover, to define "religion" as containing
a certain set of practices and beliefs today risks excluding unpopular religions or unimagined religious practices in the future. To the extent we care about pluralism, in other words,
defining religion can prove problematic. Yet, the failure to define religion is equally troubling. It is difficult to see how
courts can protect something if they cannot define it. Furthermore, the absence of a definition creates, by negative implica63
tion, another sort of (less clearly articulated) definition.
1. The Rule of Deference
The Supreme Court first applied the rule of deference in
Watson, where the Court held as a matter of federal common
law that civil courts had little role in resolving a dispute between a local church and its national parent organization.M
61. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1890) ("To call their advocacy
[of polygamy] a tenet of religion is to offend the common sense of all mankind.").
62. For instance, in Welsh v. United States, the Supreme Court struggled
with the question of whether an ethical objection to war could be considered
"religious." 398 U.S. 333, 340-44 (1970). Although the majority treated the
question as one of statutory construction, Justice Harlan pointed out that the
construction was severely strained and concurred on free exercise grounds.
See id. at 344-67 (Harlan, J., concurring). The courts have considered whether
certain beliefs or practices constitute a religion in other cases as well. See,
e.g., Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1034 (3d Cir. 1981) (rejecting the
claim that MOVE, described as a "revolutionary" organization "absolutely opposed to all that is wrong," is a religion); Founding Church of Scientology v.
United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (ruling after considerable
discussion that Hubbard Electrometers, or "E-Meters," are parts of religious
practice); United States. v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 444-45 (D.D.C. 1968) (rejecting the claim that Neo-American Church, devoted to drug use, is a genuine
religion); People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 821 (Cal. 1964) (ruling that the use of
peyote is a bona fide religious practice of the Native American Church); Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 315 P.2d 394, 406 (Cal. 1957)
(concluding after a lengthy analysis that the Fellowship of Humanity is a religion despite its lack of belief in a supreme being).
63. See Ricks, supra note 29, at 1061-64 ("[A] definition which did not exclude would not define.").
64. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727-29 (1871). Although
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Watson nominally involved the disposition of the Walnut Street
church building, in Louisville, Kentucky, but in fact turned on
whether the abolitionist majority of the local church could
wrest control of the church building from the pro-slave minority. The conflict arose in 1865, when the general church (i.e.,
the parent organization) adopted a resolution requiring members of the church to reject slavery. 65 When the pro-slavery
minority of the Walnut Street church seized the building, the
general church declared the anti-slavery majority to be the
"true" church.6 6 In the United States Supreme Court, the proslave minority argued that the church property was held in an
"implied trust" in favor of the "doctrine" to which the property
was devoted. Any departure from this doctrine entitled the adherents to the doctrine to claim the property as their own. Because the renunciation of slavery reflected a departure from
Presbyterian doctrine as it existed at the time the Walnut
Street church was founded, the minority claimed that it was
the "true" church and that both the anti-slavery majority and
the general church were usurpers.67

the internal affairs cases have been described as "hoary," Ira C. Lupu, Where
Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102
HARv. L. REv. 933, 959 (1989), modern examples of the basic problem abound.
See, e.g., Sara Kehaulani Goo, Church and Diocese Battle Over Religion, Sex,
Politics, WALL ST. J., July 7, 1999, at NEI ("Ever since St. Paul's Church began to break away from its mother religious affiliation, the Episcopal Diocese
of Massachusetts, it has been a holy war."); Cindy Richards, A Church Divided, CI. TRIB., May 13, 1999, § 2, at 1 ("What started out as an intramural
flap over the proposed renovation of a historic church in Oak Park[, Illinois] is
erupting into a battle over the separation of church and state .... ").
65. See Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 691. The resolution required members who believed in the divine character of slavery to "repent and forsake
these sins." Id. This presumably required the church members to sell their
slaves.
66. See id. at 692. The majority sought to enforce its right to the church
property in a diversity action in federal court. See id. at 694. The plaintiffs
lived in Kentucky at the time they commenced the suit. The Court ruled that
prior Kentucky state court decisions in favor of the pro-slavery minority did
not preclude the federal courts' jurisdiction in the pending action because the
prior state court decision, Watson v. Avery, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 332 (1867), dealt
only with the legitimacy of the defendants' election as church elders. Watson,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 717. The circuit court granted the majority's request for
an injunction, which the minority appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. See id.
at 699-700.
67. See Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) at 691-92. One wonders why-or
whether-support for slavery was an especially important element of Presbyterian doctrine prior to 1865.
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The Supreme Court rejected the departure-from-doctrine
rule, and declared that the members of the pro-slave minority
were not the beneficiaries of an implied trust. As the Watson
68
Court saw it, property disputes within a hierarchical church
can only be resolved by deference to the highest power within
the church organization. "[Wihenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have
been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to
which the matter has been carried, the [civil] legal tribunals
must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on
them .... -"69 This is the rule of deference-deference at its
deepest.
Watson's rule of deference resembles a contractual test.
"All who unite themselves" to a church "do so with an implied
consent to [the church's] government, and are bound to submit
to it."70 Members of a church expect a religious "association's
internal authority to act according to its own rules and in good
faith."7 1 Disappointing these expectations "breaches the understanding underlying the member-group relationship and gives
the injured member a cause of action."72 Under Jones v. Wolf,
courts can only attempt "to ascertain and effectuate the private
arrangements of affiliated churches." 73 In the Court's view, the
"'peculiar genius' of this "contractual rationale" 74 is that it "'re75
fiect[s] the intentions of the parties.'
68. A hierarchical church has a power structure simila to corporate parent and subsidiary relationships. Congregational churches, by contrast, have
no such relationships. See generally Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court
Involvement in Conflicts Over Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843,
1849-51 (1998) (describing the Court's treatment in Watson of the hierarchical
church in contrast with non-hierarchical churches).
69.

Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727.

70. Id. at 729.
71. Sirico, supra note 54, at 352.
72. Id.
73. Arlin M. Adams & William R. Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf. Church Autonomy and the Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV.

1291, 1317 (1980) (discussing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979)).
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979)). The contractual
basis of the rule of deference creates at least two problems. First, to the extent that the "locus of control" of the church is "ambiguous," a court would
have to undertake the same "searching and therefore impermissible inquiry
into church polity." Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 605 (1979) (quoting Serbian
E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 723 (1976)). To say that
church members impliedly consent to a particular polity assumes that courts
can "ascertain" that polity without delving into "forbidden" doctrine. This as-
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Contract principles do not, of course, completely explain
the rule of deference.7 6 The rule of deference implies that
courts will inquire deeply enough to determine whether there
was a contract, but not so far as to consider how to interpret
the contract, or whether one party breached it. This may be
troubling to some of us, because it gives great power to institutions that are unchecked by the state. Yet, no other alternative
works. On this view, the answer for disgruntled church members is not recourse to civil courts, but to secede and form their
77
own church.
sumption is ambitious, to say the least. Courts appear to have limited competence to make judgments about the nature of church polities. In the context of
the same factual dispute the United Lutheran Church in America was first
found to be synodical in character by a federal district court. See Evangelical
Lutheran Synod v. First English Lutheran Church, 47 F. Supp. 954, 964 (W.D.
Okla. 1942). After the district court was reversed on jurisdictional grounds by
the Court of Appeals, see First English Lutheran Church v. Evangelical Lutheran Synod, 135 F.2d 701 (10th Cir. 1943), it was found by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court to be congregational. See First English Lutheran Church v.
Bloch, 159 P.2d 1006, 1006 (Okla. 1945). Compare Duessel v. Proch, 62 A. 152,
153 (Conn. 1905); Dressen v. Brameier, 9 N.W. 193, 193 (Iowa 1881); Rock Dell
Norwegian EvangelicalLutheran Congregationv. Mommsen, 219 N.W. 88, 8889 (Minn. 1928); Mertz v. Schaeffer, 271 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954);
Gudmundson v. Thingvalla Lutheran Church, 150 N.W. 750, 750-02 (N.D.
1914); Fadness v. Braunborg,41 N.W. 84, 85 (Wis. 1889), all finding the Lutheran Church to be congregational in policy, with FirstEnglish Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. Dysinger, 6 P.2d 522, 524 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931);
Wehmer v. Fokenga, 78 N.W. 28, 29-30 (Neb. 1899); Harmon v. Dreher, 28
S.C.L. ( 1 Speers) 87, 91 (S.C. 1843), all finding the church to be hierarchical.
Professor Greenawalt has argued that it may be appropriate to treat a church
as hierarchical for certain purposes and as congregational for other purposes.
See Greenawalt, supra note 68, at 1879.
Second, a contractual rationale implies contractual exceptions to enforcement. It is, for example, well understood that contracts should not be enforced
when they result from fraud, mistake, unconscionably unequal bargaining
power, and so on. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 159-185
(1979). Yet, courts using a strict rule of deference should not make these determinations, because these inquiries require a court to determine the existence or substance of the contract, and therefore, the substance of the church's
governance. Such inquiries should theoretically be forbidden. Thus, even
where church authorities act "arbitrarily" a court will grant no relief. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 712-13 (1976); see also
infra text accompanying notes 104-33.
76. Deference can also be explained on associational grounds, as in Watson, and on Establishment Clause grounds (i.e., taking a position in an internal church dispute would result in the impermissible establishment of a religion). See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 713-14 (1872). It is difficult
to imagine a religious entanglement greater than declaring the legitimate
bearer of a faith.
77. See Laycock, supra note 3, at 1403 ("If one is ill-treated by his church,
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2. The Exceptions-Neutral Principles and Fraud or Collusion
If one views deference as the dominant civil court approach
to internal church disputes, then there are two important, if
limited, exceptions: (i) "neutral" principles, and (ii) fraud or
collusion. Either model will permit a court to inquire, at least
"marginally," into the substance of an otherwise internal
church dispute. Both also suggest that deference correlates to
contract principles. Under the neutral principles model, courts
may view the contract as being embodied in the secular legal
documents that govern the organization. The documents (e.g.,
titles, charters, bylaws) will resolve the dispute, not the vote of
the majority. Under the fraud or collusion exception, one could
say that no contract was formed. The absence of the dissident
parties' "assent" forecloses deep deference. Instead, where a
party alleges fraud or collusion, a court will delve to some extent into the substance-including the doctrine-of seemingly
internal church disputes. Implicit in this analysis is the prospect that disgruntled church members become third parties as
they leave the church.

he can leave it; if he feels bound by faith or conscience to stay in, the government can offer him no remedy."). Deference as a method of resolving internal
church disputes also poses other, more general problems. It treats religion as
"alien," as something that is beyond judicial experience or expertise. See
Sirico, supra note 54, at 351, 353. Additionally, deference assumes that the
religious component of disputes involving churches cannot be extracted from
larger disputes involving the same claimants. How would Watson have come
out, for example, if the organization in question was a non-religious group
rather than a church? Would the Court still have permitted the local organization to defy the institutional hierarchy? Probably not. See Watson, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) at 681. In fact, Watson presumed that because the disputants were
religious-even though the dispute was of only marginally religious character-the whole matter was beyond the judicial ken. See id. It seems odd to
say that the claimed religiosity of the disputants should govern the treatment
of the dispute.
Deference will also tend to favor the powerful within a given group. Deference means that courts simply rubber stamp the decisions of the majority (in
the case of a congregational church) or a higher decision-maker (in the case of
a hierarchical church). Unless one of the exceptions discussed below applies,
little inquiry may be made into the fairness or not of a particular policy or action. It is discomforting to acknowledge that courts must sometimes sanction
otherwise intolerable results out of respect for larger institutional and constitutional principles. Yet such is the nature of deference.
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a. Neutral Principles
The neutral principles exception engrafted a kind of parol
evidence rule onto the deference test of Watson.78 Courts can,
under the neutral principles test, resolve disputes about church
property either by deferring to the decisions of the church polity
(presumed to be majority rule) or by analyzing only the documents and instruments that reflect the intentions of the parties. The "formal title" version of the neutral principles doctrine permits courts to determine ownership "by studying
79
deeds, reverter clauses, and general state corporation laws."

Neutral principles assume that the parties have agreed to be
bound by these formal documents and not by extrinsic writings,
80
words, or conduct.
The Court first applied neutral principles in Jones v.
Wolf.81 The dispute in Wolf centered on the disposition of the
property of the Vineville Presbyterian Church (Vineville
Church), in Macon, Georgia, which had been incorporated in
1915. The Vineville Church, by its trustees, acquired three
parcels of real property (Vineville Property) with the proceeds
of contributions by church members. The Vineville Property
was deeded in the name of the Vineville Church, which was a
member of the Augusta-Macon Presbytery of the Presbyterian
Church in the United States (PCUS).8 2 Being a "hierarchical"
church, the local churches (e.g., the Vineville Church) were self-

78. See 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 733-35. Justice Powell's thoughtful dissent
in Jones v. Wolf characterized the test as a "restrictive rule of evidence." 443
U.S. 595, 611 (Powell, J., dissenting).
79. Maryland & Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of
God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 370 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Exactly which documents are open to examination under the doctrine is unclear. Colorado courts, for example, have examined internal church organizational documents in applying the formal title test. See Bishop & Diocese v.
Mote, 668 P.2d 948, 952-53 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd en banc, 716 P.2d 85
(Colo. 1986); Bernson v. Koch, 534 P.2d 334, 338-39 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); see
also Sirico, supra note 54, at 356.
80. Prior to the application of the neutral principles doctrine, the Court
would presumably have deferred to the decision of the highest church authority. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 17 (1929)
(holding that the archbishop had sole authority to interpret provisions of a will
creating chaplaincy); Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, 139-40
(1872) (holding that the will of the majority of the members, not minutes of the
church meeting, determines outcome).
81. 443 U.S. 595, 599-601 (1979).
82. See id. at 597.
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and congoverning in the first instance, subject to the "review
8
trol" of higher order church courts within the PCUS. 3
In 1973, a majority of members of the Vineville Church, including the pastor, elected to leave PCUS and join another denomination, the Presbyterian Church of America. The majority
faction apparently retained the Vineville Property; the minority
remained officially on the roles of the Vineville Church but, in
fact, ceased to participate in its affairs. 84 The PCUS appointed
a commission to investigate and, if possible, to resolve the
schism. The PCUS commission ultimately ruled that the minority faction was the "'true congregation'" df the Vineville
Church and withdrew from the majority faction "'all authority
to exercise office derived from the [PCUS]."'85 The majority faction apparently took no part in the inquiry.
Following the PCUS's ruling, members of the minority faction sued in state court seeking a declaration that they had the
right to "exclusive possession and use" of the Vineville Property
as members of the PCUS. 86 Applying what it characterized as
Georgia's version of "neutral principles of law," the trial court,
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia, held for the majority, denying that the minority had rights in the Vineville Property.8 7 According to the Georgia court, "neutral principles" required it to examine deeds to the Vineville Property, state
statutes dealing with implied trusts under Georgia law, and
the "Book of the Church Order" (the constitution of the PCUS)
to determine whether there was any basis for finding a trust in
favor of the PCUS. 88 After undertaking such a review, the
Georgia court concluded that the Vineville Property was deeded
in the name of the Vineville Church, and that neither the statute, the Vineville Church's charter, nor the Book of the Church
Order created an implied trust in favor of the PCUS.89 The
Georgia court concluded that, because none of these documents
created such a trust, the Vineville Property followed the deedthe "neutral" legal document-and belonged to the Vineville

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
1978)).

Id. at 598.
See id.
Id. at 598 (quoting Appellate Record at 235).
Id.
Id. at 599.
Id. at 600.
See id. at 601 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 9a; 243 S.E.2d 860, 864 (Ga.
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Church, as determined by the will of the majority of the
church's members, not the PCUS. 90
After granting certiorari, 91 the United States Supreme
Court began its analysis by noting that the "First Amendment
severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes." 92 Justice Blackmun, writing
for five Justices, therefore reasoned that the First Amendment
requires civil courts to "defer to the resolution of issues of religious doctrine or polity by the highest court of a hierarchical
church organization."93 Subject to that general limitation,
however, courts would be free to "adopt any one of various approaches for settling church property disputes so long as [the
method used] ...involves no consideration of doctrinal matters ... -94
One of these approaches---"neutral principles"-could "in
[a] general outline" 95 be consistent with the overarching rule of
deference. Neutral principles would not require complete judicial deference. Instead, courts could consider, and resolve internal church disputes using, "objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and
judges." 96 According to the Court, the neutral principles test
permits a court to ascertain the holder of legal title to property
by interpreting and applying "secular" provisions of the
church's governing documents. 97 Subject to certain limitations,
Georgia's version of neutral principles-examining deeds to the
Vineville Property, state statutes dealing with implied trusts
under Georgia law-was acceptable if Georgia recognized a
"presumptive rule of majority representation, defeasible upon a
showing that the identity of the local church is to be determined by some other means."9 8 The Constitution would not,
however, permit state courts to rely on any religious docu90. See id. at 600 (citing Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights Church,
167 S.E.2d 658, 660 (Ga. 1969)).
91. See Jones v. Wolf, 439 U.S. 891 (1978).
92. Jones, 443 U.S. at 602 (quoting Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church,
393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969)).
93. Id. (citations omitted).
94. Id. (quoting Maryland & Virginia Eldership of Churches of God v.
Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970)) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 603.
97. See id. at 599-604.
98. Id. at 607.
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ments, such as the Book of Church Order. To do so "would appear to require a civil court to pass on questions of religious
doctrine." 99
Here, the Supreme Court appeared to think the reasoning
of the Georgia courts incomplete. "Neither the trial court nor
the Supreme Court of Georgia ...explicitly stated that it was
adopting a presumptive rule of majority representation."'0 0 Because the Court "does not declare what the law of Georgia is," 101
it remanded the cause for further consideration. In other
words, the Georgia Supreme Court was not wrong in usurping
the PCUS; it simply had to show that there was a constitutionally legitimate basis in state law for doing so. The Georgia
court could not base its decision on church doctrine. It would
have to use neutral principles or none at all.10 2
It is not clear what the Court intended or accomplished in
Wolf.10 3 Wolf drained the deference rule of some of its force by
holding that neutral legal documents can control over the will
of the highest church polity. Yet, it did not necessarily undercut the larger contractual rationale of the older rule. Indeed, if
contract principles describe the boundary between churches
and third parties, one could view the neutral principles doctrine as a kind of parol evidence rule applicable solely to internal religious disputes. Deference-judicial passivity-is constitutionally compelled unless one side in an internal or doctrinal
church dispute can point to secular documents that should govern the dispute. If such documents embody the "contract" between the church and its members at a particular time, then
acting contrary to such documents strips one side in the dispute
of its "assent" as reflected in those documents. The aggrieved
party becomes, in some sense, a "third party." Stated another

99. Id. at 609 (footnote omitted). The distinction between "neutral" legal
documents, which courts may review, and documents of "doctrine," which are
forbidden to courts, is unclear. The Book of the Church Order, for example,
appears to have had elements of both. See id. Indeed, every "legal" document
will imply elements of doctrine. They will, for example, reflect the religious
views of a particular group within a church at a particular time. It is strange
to say that any document involving transactions among church members could
be "secular" (and therefore "neutral"). While such documents may appear
secular, and therefore neutral, they must reflect the intentions of their
authors and signatories. They would otherwise be largely incoherent.
100. Id. at 608.
101. Id. at 609.
102. See id.
103. See Greenawalt, supranote 68, at 1844 n.3.
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way, deference declines in proportion to the presence of third
parties.
b. Fraudor Collusion
Deference may alsd be limited where a party claims to be
the victim of "fraud" or "collusion." 1°4 As with the neutral principles exception to deep deference, contractual principles and
concern for third parties may explain the increased judicial
scrutiny found in the fraud and collusion exception. This exception was first announced as dicta in Gonzalez v. Roman
0 5 In Gonzalez, the Supreme Court afCatholic Archbishop.1
firmed a decision of the Philippine Supreme Court that dismissed a complaint challenging the refusal of the Catholic
Church to appoint the petitioner to a chaplaincy. 0 6 The chaplaincy in question was tied to a gift under a will. The heir
claimed that pursuant to the terms of the gift, he was entitled
to be made a collative chaplain. The archbishop made the petitioner a laical chaplain, which was not satisfactory to the petitioner. 0 7
The Supreme Court reasoned that "it is the function of the
church authorities to determine what the essential qualifications of a chaplain are and whether the candidate possesses
them." 08 This would have been consistent with the general
rule of deep deference to internal church workings announced
in Watson. But Gonzalez went further. "In the absence of
fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness," Justice Brandeis wrote, "the
decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation.., because the parties in interest made them so by contract or otherwise."10 9
Gonzalez therefore opened the door to "'marginal civil court
review' to determine whether ecclesiastical decisions were the
104. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 609 n.8 (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976)).

105. 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929).
106. See id. at 1-2.
107. See id. at 5.
108. Id. at 16.
109. Id. (emphasis added). One would assume there was no breach of contract claim here both because the transaction was a "gift" and because the heir
was a third party beneficiary not in being at the time the gift was made. Even
if petitioner had asserted a breach of contract (or similar) claim, the Court's
reluctance to consider doctrine would suggest that it would not have passed on
the substantive terms of the agreement.
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product of 'fraud, collusion or arbitrariness.""'10 The breadth of
this exception is unclear. In Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, the Court concluded that this exception to the
deference rule was "dictum only.""' Milivojevich also excised
"arbitrariness" from the exception, 112 properly recognizing that
judicial analysis of "arbitrariness" "must inherently entail inquiry into procedures that canon or ecclesiastical law supposedly requires the church judicatory to follow." 113 Yet it is not
clear why Milivojevich did not go on to eliminate the "fraud"
and "collusion" exceptions to the deference rule enunciated in
Gonzalez. What distinction can courts make for this purpose
between "arbitrariness," on the one hand, and "fraud" or "collusion," on the other? In any of these cases, a court will have to
delve into forbidden doctrine.
The answer may depend, in part, on whether the fraud is
religious or secular in nature, a distinction first drawn in
United States v. Ballard.114 In that case, the Ballards were indicted for conspiring to use the United States mails to commit
fraud. 115 The charge alleged that the Ballards formed corporations, sold literature, raised funds and sold "memberships" in
the "I Am" movement. Guy Ballard claimed he had been selected as a "'divine messenger'" and that, "'by reason of supernatural attainments, [he had] the power to heal persons of ailments and diseases.""'1 6 The United States alleged that Ballard
"'well knew.' these representations were false "'and [that they]
were made with the intention... to cheat, wrong, and defraud
persons ... and to obtain... money, property, and other things
of value and to convert the same to the use and the benefit of

110. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Mflivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 712 (1976)
(quoting Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Meml Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969)).

111. Id.
112. Id. at 713.
[No "arbitrariness" exception-in the sense of any inquiry whether
the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal of a hierarchical
church complied with church laws and regulations-is consistent
with the constitutional mandate that civil courts are bound to accept
the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization ....
Id.
113. Id.
114. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
115. See id. at 79.
116. Id. at 80 (quoting the record, no citation provided).
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the defendants ... .,'"117 The defendants demurred, claiming
that the indictment attacked their religious beliefs "and sought
to restrict the free exercise of their religion."" 8
The defendants and the prosecution agreed that the jury
question should be limited to whether the defendants "'honestly
and in good faith believe[d]'" their representations." 9 "'If these
defendants did not believe those things, they did not believe
that Jesus came down and dictated [to them] ... but used the
mail for the purpose of getting money, the jury should find
them guilty."120 After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the
defendants sought a new trial, claiming that withdrawing the
related question of the truth of these representations effectively
amended the indictment in violation of due process. The new
trial motion was denied. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed, concluding that the district court should not
have restricted the question to that of the "good faith" of the defendants.' 2 ' Instead, the jury should have considered whether
the United States proved that "'some, at least, of the represen122
tations which [the defendants] schemed to make were false."
The truth or falsity of these religious representations should
have formed the basis of the conviction, according to the court.
The Supreme Court disagreed. The "truth or verity" of the
defendants' religious doctrines or beliefs should not have been
submitted to the jury. 123 Citing Watson, Justice Douglas reasoned that "'[the law knows no heresy, and is committed to the
support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect."' 124 No civil
court could pass on the verity of the Ballards' claims because
"[mien may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be
put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs." 125 The
Court therefore reversed and remanded the case to the court of
appeals to "pass on the questions reserved." 126
117. Id. (quoting the record, no citation provided).
118. Id. at 81.
119. Id. (quoting the record, no citation provided).
120. Id. at 81-82 (quoting the record, no citation provided). It is not clear
why defendants' "honest" belief mattered. Presumably, scienter was an element of the claim.
121. Id. at 83 (citing Ballard v. United States, 138 F.2d 540 (1944)).
122. Id. (quoting Ballard, 138 F.2d at 545).
123. Id. at 86.
124. Id. (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1871)).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 88 (citing Lutcher & Moore Lumber Co. v. Knight, 217 U.S. 257,
267-68 (1910); Brown v. Fletcher, 237 U.S. 583 (1915)). The Ballard Court
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Two dissenting opinions argued in opposite directions.
One, from Justice Stone, claimed that the Constitution does not
"afford[] immunity from criminal prosecution for the fraudulent
procurement of money by false statements as to one's religious
experiences" 127 The other, by Justice Jackson, argued that the
indictment should have been dismissed in its entirety. "The
chief wrong which false prophets do to their following is not financial," he argued, but is "on the mental and spiritual
plane." 128 Yet courts have no role in redressing such harm, because prosecutions of this character "could easily degenerate
129
into religious persecution."
Ballard distinguished religious fraud from secular fraud. 30
Douglas's majority opinion construed the Ballards' representations as being religious in nature, and therefore beyond the judicial ken. Justice Jackson's dissent agreed on that point, but
argued that the stopping point should come with secular fraud.
According to Justice Jackson, "making false representations on
matters other than faith or experience"' 31 could be grounds for
prosecution. Thus, Justice Jackson reasoned, "if one represents
that funds are being used to construct a church when in fact
they are being used for personal purposes," 132 one should be
subject to prosecution.
The difference between religious and secular fraud is not
entirely clear, but the nature of the claims made and the availappeared to be motivated at least partly by the effect affirmance could have
had on minority religions:
If one could be sent to jail because a jury in a hostile environment
found those teachings false, little indeed would be left of religious
freedom. The Fathers of the Constitution were not unaware of the
varied and extreme views of religious sects, of the violence of disagreement among them, and of the lack of any one religious creed on
which men could agree .... The religious views espoused by [the defendants] might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most people.
But if those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with
finding their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect.
Id. at 87. It is not clear how prosecutions for fraud would necessarily result in
the persecution of minority religions. The state could clearly prosecute fraud
in solicitation. Ballard appears to stand for the proposition that it could not
do so where the basic representations were religious in nature.
127. Id. at 88-89.
128. Id. at 94 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 93-95.
130. See Jonathan Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Protection: "Religion" in
the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593, 607 (1964).
131. Ballard,322 U.S. at 93-95 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 95.
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ability of a judicial remedy help draw the distinction. 133 Fraud
would be religious in character if it were beyond the power of a
court to redress. The constitutional and institutional impediments to defining religion-the anxiety of entanglement-prevent judges from determining the truth of the Ballards' claims.
How could a civil court determine, much less remedy, heresy or
false prophecy? The answer may lie in concern for third parties. If the rule of deference rests on a contractual understanding of the relationship between a church and its members,
it follows that one who is "fraudulently" induced to join a
church is not, in fact, a member of that church. Perhaps fraud,
and its sibling collusion, remain a basis for civil court intervention precisely because fraud, like the "neutral principles" doctrine, converts dissenting adherents into third parties.
C. THE CONTINUUM OF DEFERENCE-DISTINGUISHING
RELIGIOUS AND COMMERCIAL CONDUCT

The internal affairs cases form one end of the continuum of
deference. The deep deference of these cases is an acceptable
means of defining religion, in part, because third parties would
not be affected by treating what appear to be disputes about
property disposition or corporation structure as doctrinal matters beyond judicial remedy. Yet, the Court has not deferred
deeply to claims that conduct is a religious exercise where third
parties would be harmed. Rather, the continuum of deference
suggests that deference declines, and judicial scrutiny increases, in proportion to the likelihood of third-party harm. At
the least deferential end of the continuum, the Court independ133. The distinction between religious and secular fraud appears to have
played an important role in a recent case. See United States v. Lilly, 37 F.3d
1222, 1226 (7th Cir. 1994). There, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that religious actors could be prosecuted for fraudulent solicitation where the fraud involved misrepresentations about the use of solicited
funds. See id. Distinguishing the internal affairs cases, the Seventh Circuit
reasoned that:
Pastor's Lilly's offense pertained solely to the way in which [the Pastor] procured the "church" funds in the first place. Pastor Lilly obtained the money by, among other things, making fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions of material fact in the sale of the
Certificates of Deposit ....Pastor Lilly was convicted not because the

government or the court decided that the Church had spent its money
unvisely, but because Pastor Lilly did not spend the [solicited funds]
in the way that he promised the investors he would, and because he
lied to the investors about their ability to recover their investment
principal upon certificate maturity.
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ently scrutinizes the claim of exemption in what can be called a
transactional analysis.13 4 Cases most frequently appearing at
this end of the continuum involve the overlap of the seemingly
disparate worlds of religion and commerce, where churches
seek competitive, tax or other "commercial" advantages not
available to secular citizens or groups engaged in the same
conduct. In most of these cases, the Court has not deferred to
the claim of religious exercise, but instead independently charfor example, a taxacterized the transaction that occurred as,
135
able sale or an employment relationship.
The distinction between religion and commerce is not always easy to make. 136 Churches borrow money for their own
undertakings, such as building repairs, and to support church137
related activities, such as low income housing projects.
Priests have been known to moonlight as real estate developers. 138 The National Association of Church Food Service, Inc.,
in Atlanta recently reported that its membership had grown
ten-fold (to 200 member churches) between 1990 and 1998 as
more churches offer a location to hold wedding receptions, funerals and lunches. 139 St. Bartholomew's Church in mid-town
134. See Jonathan 0. Lipson, FirstPrinciplesand FairConsideration:The
Developing Clash Between the FirstAmendment and the ConstructiveFraudulent Conveyance Laws, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 247,280-81 (1997).
135. See, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S.
290, 295 (1985). Discussions about what constitutes a religious "exercise" frequently collapse into discussions about the nature of the "burden" on exercise.
See generally Lupu, supra note 64 (discussing the "character of government
activity necessary to constitute a 'burden). In this way, courts tend to define
religion in relation to the "burden" imposed. But focusing on burdens rather
than the underlying activity is simply another form of deference. How does a
court know whether a law burdens the free exercise of religion if it does not
know what forms the "religion" part of the analysis?
136. Of course, even if a court concludes that an activity is both religious
and commercial, an exemption from a generally applicable law may be appropriate. See Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 238 (Mass. 1994)
("The fact that the defendants' [landlords'] free exercise of religion claim arises
in a commercial context, although relevant when engaging in a balancing of
interests, does not mean that their constitutional rights are not substantially
burdened.").
137. See Leslie Eaton, Banks Put Their Faith in Building Churches, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 1999, § 1, at 19; Stephen A. Kliment, When Placesof the Spirit
Face ConcreteRealities, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1998, § 11, at 1; see also It's Better if You're White, ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1999, at 28 (discussing churchsponsored mammography programs in South-Central Los Angeles).
138. See John Ellement & Richard S. Kindleberger, Cleric Seeks to Balance
SecularAvocation, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 19, 1998, at Bl.
139. See Business Bulletin, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1998, at Al.
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Manhattan feeds both the poor and, from its Cafe St. Bart, the
not-so-poor. 140 Churches increasingly give "premiums" such as
Super Bowl tickets to lure rich donors.' 4 ' Churches and synagogues are increasingly being viewed as social centers; 142 religious themes are pop culture memes. 143 And because "rent is
more reliable than the collection plate," 144 churches throughout
the nation are leasing spire space to telecommunications companies. It would be difficult to say in any but the broadest
45
sense that all of these activities are religious exercises.
At least on the basis of current precedent, it appears that
the Supreme Court would agree. The case that most closely
considered the question-and that forms the least deferential
end of the continuum-is Tony and Susan Alamo Foundationv.
Secretary of Labor,146 where the Court held that a church that
ran "commercial" businesses was bound by the minimum wage
and reporting requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA). 47 Despite the religious mission of the organization,
granting a free exercise exemption would give an intolerable
competitive advantage to the church. Deferring not to the peti140. See id. St. Bartholomew's Church has also been the subject of an important religious-use case involving its buildings. In 1990, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the church was not entitled to an exemption from
New York's landmark's preservation statute in order to build an office tower
where its "historic" community house stood. See St. Bartholomew's Church v.
City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 359-60 (2d Cir. 1990).
141. See Lisa Miller, Religious Institutions Are Invoking Premiums to Inspire the Wealthy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 1999, at Al.
142. See Monica P. Yazigi, The New Social Church, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 1,
1998, § 9, at 1.
143. See Joan Anderson, Heaven Can Wait: In Pop, the spiritualis soaring,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 8, 1998, at Li. "Loosely speaking, a meme is an element
of culture: a word, a song, an attitude, a religious belief, a mealtime ritual, a
technology." Robert Wright, You Can Copy Off Me, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV.,
Apr. 25, 1999, at 12 (reviewing SUSAN BLAcKMORE, THE MEME MAcHINE
(1999)).
144. Jon G. Auerbach, Holy Toll Calls: Telecom Companies Now Turn to
Heaven, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23 1997, at Al.
145. Compare Laycock, supra note 3, at 1390 ("Any activity engaged in by a
church as a body is an exercise of religion." (footnote omitted)), with id. at
1409 ("Even so, [a church's] interest in conducting a worship service is clearly
greater than its interest in organizing a trip to a baseball game for the church
men's club."). While the distinction Professor Laycock makes has an intuitive
appeal, it does not answer the analytically prior questions: (i) who gets to
make the distinction, a church or a civil court? and, (ii) does activity that potentially harms third parties change the analysis?
146. 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
147. See id. at 304-06; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

618

[Vol. 84:589

tioners' characterization of the transaction, but instead to the
"objectively ascertainable facts" adduced by the lower courts,
the Court reasoned that the religious claimants' service stations, retailing clothing and grocery outlets, hog farms, roofing
148
and electrical construction companies and other businesses
(i) "serve[d] the general public," and (ii) "compet[ed]" with "ordinary commercial enterprises." 149 0These activities, the Court
15
held, were not exercises of religion.
The Alamo Court appears to have based its conclusion on
concern for third parties. Without an obligation to pay a minimum wage, the Court reasoned that the Foundation enjoyed a
competitive advantage over "ordinary commercial enterprises"
that were so obligated. 5 1 The FLSA, the Court reasoned, forbade "exactly this kind of 'unfair... competition. 1 52 While the
Alamo Court did not explicitly say that it would scrutinize a
claim of religious exercise more closely when the result would
be third-party harm, it is easy to see such a relationship. Thus,
in that case
Alamo was far less deferential to the claimants
53
than was the Court in United States v. Lee. 1
In Lee, the Court declined to exempt Amish farmers from
participation in the social security system, reasoning that if one
"enter[s] into commercial activity as a matter of choice," one's
religious beliefs "are not to be superimposed on the statutory
schemes which are binding on others in the activity." 154 Yet, it
appears that Lee did consider the refusal to participate in the
social security system an exercise of religion. Indeed, the Lee
Court deferred deeply, reasoning that "[i]t is not within 'the judicial function and judicial competence'. . . to determine
whether [the Amish] or the Government has the proper interpretation of the Amish faith; '[clourts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation."' 155
148. Alamo, 471 U.S. at 292, 299.
149. Id. at 299 (citing Donovan v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 567 F.
Supp. 556, 573 (W.D. Ark. 1982); Donovan v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found.,
722 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1983)).
150.

See id.

151. Id. at 299.
152. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)(3)).
153. 455 U.S. 252, 254-55 (1982).
154. Id. at 261.
155. Id. at 257. (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indep. Employment Sec.
Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981)); see also Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 137 (1987) (deferring to claim that refusal to
work on Sabbath is religious exercise).
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Perhaps the different approaches of Alamo and Lee reflect
the Court's concern for third parties. While identifiable, private individuals engaged in, and were harmed by, the same
"businesses" as those run by the Alamo claimants, no comparable third parties could be identified in Lee. The social security
system does not implicate identifiable third parties, but all (or
most) United States citizens. Like the police power generally,
the state is not seeking to protect private rights or prevent discrete or identifiable harms.
The attempt to distinguish religion from commerce shows
how the continuum of deference protects third parties from
harm by religious exercise. 156 Thus, in Braunfeld v. Brown, for
example, the Court refused to void Sunday closing laws as excessively burdensome to Jews, who were forced to close for two
days rather than one because they observe Sabbath on Saturday. 157 Braunfeld granted no exemption to Saturday Sabbatarian Jews because, the Court reasoned, "the Sunday law
simply regulates a secular activity and ...does not inconvenience all members of the Orthodox Jewish faith but only those
who believe it necessary to work on Sunday." 5 8 Rather than
defer, the Court engaged in a transactional analysis. The competitive advantage that Saturday Sabbatarians would enjoy by
opening on Sunday, while others were closed, seemed to the
Court an intolerable level of harm to third parties. 59 Perhaps
156. The continuum appears outside the commercial context, as well. In

Smith, for example, the Court appears to have deferred deeply to the claim
that smoking peyote was a religious exercise. The Smith Court initially remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Oregon to determine, in part,
whether smoking peyote was a religious exercise that violated Oregon's criminal law. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 673-74 (1988). On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court engaged in a fairly thorough analysis of peyote religions, and concluded that the activity was, indeed, a religious exercise.
See Smith v. Employment Div., 763 P.2d 146, 148 (Or. 1988). Back in the Supreme Court, it appears that Justice Scalia did not challenge the Oregon
court's analysis. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876 (1990).
This would be logical if one recognizes a continuum of deference, since it would
appear that smoking peyote, even if illegal, posed little likelihood of thirdparty harm. The analysis would likely differ if, instead, the claimants sought
to use a controlled substance that was considered a threat to public welfare,
e.g., cocaine, heroin, etc. Compare United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439,

444-45 (D.D.C. 1968) (rejecting a claim that the Neo-American Church, devoted to drug use, is a genuine religion), with People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813,
821-22 (Cal. 1964) (ruling that the use of peyote is a bona fide religious practice of the Native American Church).
157. 366 U.S. 599, 601, 609 (1961).
158. Id. at 605 (emphasis added).
159. See id. at 608-09.
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this concern led the Court to scrutinize the activity in question
independently, and to conclude that it was secular rather than
religious.
Similarly, the religion and tax cases, where the government is a creditor, and thus much like a private third party,
find the Court engaged in an independent analysis of the
transactions in question. In Hernandez v. Commissioner160 for
example, the Court determined that contributions to the
Church of Scientology for "auditing" and training sessions' 6 1
were not deductible under § 170 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Similarly, in Jimmy SwaggartMinistries v. Board of Equalization, the Court held that California's sales and use tax was constitutional even as applied to sales of religious items by a recognized church.' 62 California's "sales and use tax is not a tax
on the right to disseminate religious information .... [RIather,
it is a tax on the privilege of making retail sales of tangible
personal property... in California." 163
The transactional approach does not always result in denial of a religious exemption. The Murdock v. Pennsylvania16 4
and Follett v. McCormick' 65 decisions held that the "sale" of religious pamphlets by evangelists was a form of "preaching" exempt from certain regulations. 166 Yet the Court in these cases
did not defer blindly to the claim that the activities were religious exercises. In Murdock, the Court discussed at length the
religious history and significance of door-to-door evangelism.
Here, "spreading one's religious beliefs or preaching the Gospel
through distribution of religious literature and through personal visitations" was seen as "an age-old type of evangelism
with as high a claim to constitutional protection as the more or160. 490 U.S. 680 (1989), affg Hernandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1212
(1st Cir. 1987), and Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1987). It
is admittedly less than clear that the government as taxing authority is a
"third party" akin to the "ordinary commercial businesses" at issue in Alamo.
Nevertheless, it is clear that, as taxing authority, the government shares
many qualities with other commercial actors, primarily as a creditor asserting
claims against the religious debtor. In this sense, the government is not acting in its police power in the abstract, but as a third party seeking payment.
161. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 685. According to the Court, "auditing" is the
process in Scientology by which a person becomes aware of his or her immortal
spiritual dimension. Id. at 684.
162. 493 U.S. 378, 389-90 (1990).
163. Id. at 389.
164. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
165. 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
166. Follett, 321 U.S. at 577; Murdock, 319 U.S. at 109.
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thodox types."1 67 In Follett, the Court extended the Murdock
holding to non-itinerant door-to-door solicitors. While these decisions fail to explain how the "religious" component outstripped the "sale" component, the Court as a matter of method
appeared unwilling to defer 8deeply to the claim that the activity was a religious exercise.16
The continuum of deference is not a perfect model. There
are certainly exceptions, including Reynolds and Davis, which
appear to flout it. 169 Those cases resolutely, if narrowly, define
religion to exclude plural marriage from the umbrella of constitutional protection. They are hardly deferential. Yet it is not
clear who would have been harmed by an exemption in those
167. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 110.
168. Id. at 109 (noting that the activity was "more than preaching... more
than distribution of religious literature. It is a combination of both"); cf. Follett, 321 U.S. at 576 ("We must [] accept as bona fide appellant's assertion that
he was 'preaching the gospel' by going 'from house to house presenting the
gospel of the kingdom in printed form.'").
The Murdock Court acknowledged that "[slituations will arise where it
will be difficult to determine whether a particular activity is religious or
purely commercial." 319 U.S. at 110. Although the Court characterized this
distinction as "vital," id., it offered little guidance as to how to make it. Relying on biblical references, id. at 108 (quoting Acts 20:20 and Mark 16:15), and
analogies to "more orthodox" types of religions, id. at 110, the Court essentially took the view that, whatever else may or may not be "religious" exercise,
"it plainly cannot be said that petitioners were engaged in a commercial rather
than a religious venture." Id. at 111. It would appear that, in fact, the distinction between the "religious" and the "commercial" was not "vital" because,
less than a generation later, in Swaggart, the Court concluded that Murdock
and Follett turned on the prior restraint caused by the state's laws involved in
those earlier cases. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493
U.S. 378, 385-92 (1990) (holding that the levying and collection of generally
applicable sales and use taxes imposed no constitutionally significant burden
on the appellants (evangelists)). Although the problem of prior restraints is
beyond the scope of this Article, it would appear that judicial discomfort with
prior restraints is, like concern for third-party harm, one of several constitutional values that courts consider when approaching the definitional question.
169. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 347-48 (1890) (upholding a law requiring Mormons to swear that they were not polygamists); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-68 (1878) (upholding a conviction for polygamy). Another interesting example, which produced a very different result, is
the Lukumi case, where the Court struck down a municipal ordinance intended to stop members of the Santeria faith from sacrificing animals, as required by their faith. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993). The Lukumi case contains a thoughtful
and thorough discussion of the role of animal sacrifice in a variety of religions.
See id. at 524-30. Unless one believes animals should be treated as third parties in the religious liberty context, it is difficult to see how anyone in Hialeah,
Florida would have been harmed by permitting the Santeria to sacrifice pigeons, doves, ducks, guinea pigs, goats, sheep or turtles.
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cases.1 70 If assent is a basis for deference, then the assent of
spouses to plural marriage should limit judicial inquiry in most
cases. Indeed, perhaps part of what offends us today about
Reynolds and Davis is their Orwellian vision of the state. Plural marriage offended the Court not because identifiable individuals would have suffered if it were permitted, but because it
was a "barbarous practice."1 7 ' Yet this level of governmental
intrusion should be intolerable, on religious liberty and other
72
grounds.'
D. YOUNG AND THOMAS-DEEPDEFERENCE DESPITE THIRDPARTY HARM

The continuum of deference helps explain the varying degrees of deference courts have given religious actors who claim
to be engaged in an exercise of religion. The more likely a third
party is to suffer a "private" harm, such as competitive disadvantage or the nonpayment of a debt, the more closely the
Court will scrutinize whether the activity is actually a religious
exercise. Put another way, deference declines as courts perceive third parties to be at risk of harm from treating an activity as a religious exercise. Where third parties would be
harmed by defining an activity as a religious exercise, deference is inappropriate. Against this backdrop, the Young and
Thomas cases appear unusual. The courts in both cases defer
deeply to claims that the activities in question are religious exercises. Both fail to engage in the independent transactional
analysis one would expect from commercial cases such as
Alamo. This failure is troubling when one considers the consequences to third parties of granting such exemptions.
170. The Court undoubtedly believed that all of society would suffer if plural marriage were tolerated. In 1890, the Court upheld an act of Congress annulling the charter of the Church of Latter Day Saints and seizing most of its
real estate because the church's basic tenet of polygamy was a "barbarous
practice" and a "blot on our civilization." Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 49 (1890). Yet "civilization" is a very broad category. Today, it is difficult to identify who, exactly,
would suffer any but the most attenuated harm if the Court were to recognize
a plural marriage free exercise exemption.
171. Id.
172. If courts take Smith's hybrid rights theory seriously, perhaps they
should recognize a hybrid religious and personal privacy right, conjoining with
the right of free exercise the rights enumerated in such decisions as Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 959 (1973), Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), or Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Thus, they could recognize a free exercise
exemption for plural marriage.
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1. Young
In Young, 7 3 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
found that insolvent religious donors were exempt under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) 7 4 from the
constructive fraudulent conveyance rules of the United States
Bankruptcy Code. 7 5 In the process, Young permitted an otherwise avoidable transaction to survive over the fairly overt,
private harm to unpaid creditors of the donors. While tithing
may be a religious exercise under some definitions of religion,
the level of deference seen in Young is unprecedented where
the harm to third parties is so readily identifiable.
Bruce and Nancy Young, married debtors, regularly gave
ten percent of their annual income to their church notwithstanding their growing insolvency. 17 6 During the year preceding the filing of their bankruptcy petition, and while insolvent,
they contributed a total of $13,450 to the Crystal Evangelical
Free Church. 1'7 After the Youngs went into bankruptcy, their
Chapter 7 trustee sued the Youngs and their church under
§ 548(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code to recover these payments as constructive fraudulent conveyances. This section of
the Bankruptcy Code empowers a bankruptcy trustee to avoid
and recover transfers by an insolvent debtor to the extent that
the debtor received less than reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for the debtor's transfer. 178 Both the bankruptcy
173. See Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82
F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996), reh'g en banc denied, 89 F.3d 494 (8th Cir. 1996)
(holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 is a defense to a
fraudulent conveyance action), cert. granted sub nom. Christians v. Crystal
Evangelical Church, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997) (vacating the judgment and remanding in light of the holding in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
(striking the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 as applied to a state
zoning law)), affd 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 43
(1998).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994).
175. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1994).
176. See In re Young, 82 F.3d at 1410; see also Laurie Goodstein, Religious
Groups Fight U.S. in Bankruptcy Case, WASH. POST, May 23, 1994, at Al; Pierre Thomas, Clinton Stops Justice Department from Seeking Forfeiture of
Tithes, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 1994, at AS.
177. See In re Young, 82 F.3d at 1410.
178. See 11 U.S.C. § 548. The Religious Liberty and Charitable Contribution Protection Act amended the Bankruptcy Code to clarify that charitable
contributions are not fraudulent transfers unless made with fraudulent intent.
The bill applied to pending cases and it preempts state court litigation once a
bankruptcy petition has been filed. It protects any organization that is taxexempt under § 170(c)(1) or (c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, without dis-
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court 179 and the district court 180 held that the Youngs received
little or no value in exchange for their donations. Since they
were insolvent when they made the donations, the payments
were avoidable constructive fraudulent conveyances.
Before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, the Youngs claimed that tithing was a religious exercise that was protected by RFRA. Section 3 of RFRA codifies
the strict scrutiny standards of Sherbert v. Verner 181 and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 182 providing that "[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability [unless the
government shows that the law] (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
18 3
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest."
84
After reasoning that it could apply RFRA retroactively,1 the
Eighth Circuit reversed the lower courts, concluding that recovery of the Youngs' tithes "substantially burden[ed]" their

tinguishing religious and secular charities.
179. See Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 148
B.R. 886, 896 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992). In the bankruptcy court, the parties
stipulated that the only significant issue to resolve was whether the Youngs
received reasonably equivalent value in exchange for their donations. The
bankruptcy court, acting prior to the enactment of RFRA, granted the trustee's
motion and denied the Youngs' motion, holding that the debtors had received
no economic value for their tithe. Any benefit the Youngs received was religious, not economic, in nature. See id. at 893-94 & n.10.
180. See Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 152
B.R. 939, 948-49 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993). On appeal from the bankruptcy
court, the district court upheld the bankruptcy court's finding that the debtors
received inadequate consideration. See id. at 949. Goodwill and church services, the district court concluded, were not the sort of fairly concrete benefits
that constitute reasonably equivalent value for fraudulent conveyance purposes. See id. at 950.
181. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
182. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
183. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994). RFRA's stated purposes are: "(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner ...and
Wisconsin v. Yoder ...and to guarantee its application in all cases where free

exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and (2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government." Id. § 2000bb(b). As discussed in Part II, I call this set of tests
"strong" protection for religious liberty under the Free Exercise Clause, as distinguished from the "weak" protection afforded by Smith and Boerne.
184. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d
1407, 1416-17 (8th Cir. 1996), reh'g en banc denied, 89 F.3d 494 (8th Cir.
1996), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997), affd 141

F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 43 (1998).
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free exercise of religion, was not in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest and therefore violated RFRA.18 5
The Young court began its analysis by acknowledging that,
to be a "substantial burden," "'the governmental action must
burden a religious belief rather than a philosophy or a way of
life. [T]he burdened belief must be sincerely held by the [person]."186 The court purported to apply the three-prong test developed in Werner v. McCotter, which construed a "substantial
burden" under RFRA as being a law, rule or regulation that (i)
"significantly inhibit[ed] or constrain[ed] conduct or expression
that manifests some central tenet of a [person's] individual beliefs," (ii) "meaningfully curtail[ed]" the ability to "express adherence" to a person's faith, or (iii) denied a person "reasonable
opportunities to engage in those activities that are fundamental" to the person's religion. 18 7 Yet with little analysis, Young
"assume[d] that the recovery of these contributions would substantially burden the debtors' free exercise of religion."188 The
185. Id. at 1417.
186. Id. (quoting Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1480 n.1 (10th Cir.
1995) (citation omitted)). This statement poses several problems. First, it is
not clear what distinction a court could draw between a "religious belief," on
the one hand, and a "philosophy or way of life," on the other. Certainly it is
difficult to understand how, as the Young court concluded, spending money
(tithing) is the former rather than the latter. It is also difficult to understand
how a court using the Werner formulation could ever determine the sincerity
of belief if,
as the Hernandez court noted, "[iut
is not within the judicial ken to
question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants' interpretations of those creeds." Hernandez v.
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1988); see also Employment Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) ("It is no more appropriate for judges to determine
the 'centrality' of religious beliefs before applying a 'compelling interest' test in
the free exercise field, than it would be for them to determine the 'importance'
of ideas before applying the 'compelling interest' test in the free speech field.").
The Young court addressed none of these problems.
187. In re Young, 82 F.3d at 1418 (citing Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476,
1480 (10th Cir. 1995)).
188. Id. There are other tests that could be applied to determine whether a
law imposes a "substantial burden." For instance, a court could consider
whether, like the Ninth Circuit, a religious practice is "mandated" by the adherent's religion. Under this test:
"the religious adherent ...has the obligation to prove that a governmental [action] burdens the adherent's practice of his or her religion.., by preventing him or her from engaging in conduct.., which
the faith mandates. This interference must be more than an inconvenience; the burden must be substantial and an interference with a
tenet or belief that is central to religious doctrine."
Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Graham v. C.I.R.,
822 F.2d 844, 850-51 (9th Cir. 1987), affd sub nom. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1988)). Although tithing (or other forms of religious
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court concluded summarily that "[plermitting the government
to recover these contributions would effectively prevent the
debtors from tithing, at least for the year immediately preceding the filing of the bankruptcy petitions."'8 9
The court dismissed as irrelevant the bankruptcy trustee's
arguments that avoiding and recovering the tithes would not
burden the religious exercise of the Youngs or their church.
For example, the trustee argued, the Youngs could continue to
tithe in the future, and there were other ways in which the
Youngs could express their religious beliefs besides paying
cash. 190 Moreover, the retroactive nature of the fraudulent
conveyance laws (only payments already made can be avoided)
meant that, logically, the Youngs' right to tithe was not impaired. 19 1 The court disagreed. "It is sufficient that the governmental action in question meaningfully curtails, albeit retroactively, a religious practice of more than minimal
significance in a way that is not merely incidental." 192 Young
therefore identifies a burden without explaining why the burdened activity was a religious exercise. What, exactly, made
tithing a "religious practice?"
The problem with Young is one of method, not conclusion.
If the continuum of deference accurately correlates judicial
scrutiny with the likelihood of third-party harm, then Young
defies this continuum. Where third parties are likely to be
harmed, courts (or at least the Supreme Court) will not defer
deeply, as did the Young court. Instead, they will-and
should-independently analyze the transaction that actually
occurred. Since the nonpayment of creditors is a readily cognizable third-party harm, it is difficult to understand why Young
failed to scrutinize tithing independently.
Under the transactional analysis in cases like Alamo, the
Court could have concluded that, while third parties would be
spending) may be strongly encouraged, it is unclear whether it is mandated,
although the meaning of the term "mandate" is admittedly unclear. It is also
not clear that tithing commitments must be fulfilled in cash.
189. In re Young, 82 F.3d at 1418.
190. See id.
191. But compare the reasoning of the Bankruptcy Court in In re Newman,
which held that tithing is complete in the giving (not necessarily the keeping)
of the tithe. See Morris v. Midway Southern Baptist Church (In re Newman),
183 B.R. 239, 251 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995).
192. In re Young, 82 F.3d at 1418-19 (citing In re Tessier, 190 B.R. 396,
403-04 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1995)). It is not entirely clear why the Young court
did not find avoidance of the tithe "merely incidental." Id.
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harmed by treating tithing as religious exercise, this harm was
minimal in contrast to the religious significance of the activity.193 Alternatively, the Young court could also have looked to
Murdock for guidance, to conclude that tithing was akin to
"spreading one's religious beliefs or preaching the Gospel
through distribution of religious literature and through personal visitations," and was therefore "an age-old type of evangelism with as high a claim to constitutional protection as the
more orthodox types." 194 The Young court could also have engaged in Wittgenstein's analogical method commended by professors Freeman 195 and Greenawalt. 196 If the court "looked and
saw" the transactions in question, it could have concluded that
the regular donation of 10% of one's income to a church was but
one of a series of "similarities" and "relationships" between ac197
tivities we would generally consider to be religious exercise.
The Young court did none of these things. It simply deferred deeply to the claim that tithing was a religious exercise.
The methodological problem is that of all incomplete judicial
193. See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290,
299 (citing Donovan v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 567 F. Supp. 566, 573
(W.D. Ark. 1982); Donovan v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 722 F.2d 397, 400
(8th Cir. 1983)).
194. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110 (1943).
195. See Freeman, supra note 27, at 1534-48.
196. See Greenawalt, supra note 27, at 762-76.
197. NVITTGENSTEIN, supra note 51, § 66, 31-32. If one believes the Old and
New Testaments are a guide, it is actually not so clear as one may think. See
Keating, supra note 1, at 1055. Both texts contain many references to an obligation to tithe, or at least to an obligation to give back to God out of the mnaterial things we are given. Some Old Testament examples include Exodus 23:19
("Bring the best of the first fruits of your soil to the house of the Lord your
God."), and Malachi 3:8 ("'Will a man rob God? Yet you rob me. But you ask,
"How do we rob you?' In tithes and offerings."). For more Old Testament references to tithing, see Genesis 28:22 ("[Alnd this stone that I have set up as a
pillar will be God's house, and of all that you give me I will give you a tenth.")
and Deuteronomy 26:1-14 (explaining procedures for offering first fruits). Yet
the Bible would also appear to command the faithful to pay their debts. In the
Old Testament, Psalms 37:21 says, "[tihe wicked borrow and do not repay, but
the righteous give generously...." Another Old Testament passage, Proverbs
3:27-28, says: "Do not withhold good from those who deserve it, when it is in
your power to act. Do not say to your neighbor, 'Come back later; I'll give it
tomorrow,' vhen you have it with you." Jesus rebuked the Pharisees for focusing on their tithe at the expense of justice to their fellow men in Luke
11:42: "Woe to you Pharisees, because you give God a tenth ... but you neglect justice and the love of God. You should have practiced the latter without
leaving the former undone." Since the Bible contains no priority-of-payment
rules, one may ask how, as a matter of ecclesiastical law, insolvent debtors
should spend their limited funds.
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opinions: What is the precedential value? 198 What kind of
roadmap does the Young court draw for future religious claimants, or for those who believe they have been aggrieved by religious actors or their activities? The answer appears to be
none. At all but a superficial level, the Young court failed to
explain why tithing is a religious exercise and spending money
more generally is not. While most of us would agree intuitively
that the Youngs' tithes were a religious exercise (whether or
not entitled to protection from avoidance being a separate question), the Young court provides no analytic basis for deciding
future cases.
Deference of this sort may be acceptable in resolving internal church matters or disputes between religious claimants and
the state in the exercise of its police power. However, where
third parties are harmed, such deference is troubling for at
least three reasons. 199 First, and most obviously, the decision
subjects third parties to the definitional whims of religious actors. What if, instead of tithing, the Youngs' religion compelled
them to worship on someone else's private property? 200 Nothing in the Young decision would help a court considering
whether such a violation of private rights was also a religious
exercise. Second, deference dilutes the seriousness with which
courts should approach all religious liberty disputes. Deference
is judicial indifference to both the religious actors and third
parties. Religious actors deserve to know why the law does or
does not protect their free exercise rights. Third, deference undermines the credibility of the judiciary. We reasonably expect
more of judges when disputes involve concrete harms to identifiable individuals. Deference disappoints those expectations.

198. See generally Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92
HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
199. The nature of the harm in question is discussed in detail infra Part
II.D.'.
200. Consider, in this connection, the Lyng case, where Justice O'Connor
refused to stop the federal government from building a road that would "'virtually destroy the ... Indians' ability to practice their religion."' Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451-52 (1988). If
the property in question, the Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National
Forest, was private property instead, would the result have been different?
Consider, in this regard, Justice O'Connor's concern that, if the Court recognized a free exercise exemption in Lyng, then "[similar claims] could easily require de facto beneficial ownership of some rather spacious tracts of public
property." Id. at 453. For an excellent critique of Lyng, see Lupu, supra note
64, at 945-46.
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2. Thomas
If the deference of Young were limited to that case, it may
be distinguishable as simply a hard, and perhaps unusual,
case. But Young's general approach to the definitional problem-deep deference notwithstanding third-party harm-appeared again in the (now withdrawn) opinion in Thomas.
There, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
effectively held that leasing real property is an exercise of religion that permits landlords to discriminate against unmarried
20 1
couples, in violation of fair housing laws.
The landlords in the Thomas case, Kevin Thomas and
Joyce Baker, leased residential real estate in Anchorage,
Alaska. Both were "professed Christians who believe that cohabitation between unmarried individuals constitutes the sin of
fornication and that facilitating cohabitation in any way is tantamount to facilitating sin."202 Thomas and Baker 20 3 "committed themselves to practicing their faith in all aspects of their
lives, including their commercial activities as landlords."2 0 4 Although the landlords "willingly rent[ed] to persons of any
race.., gender, single persons, and separated or widowed persons, they refuse[d]5 to rent to unmarried persons who plan[ned]
20
to live together.
The landlords' refusal to rent to unmarried couples violated the fair housing statutes of both Alaska and the City of
Anchorage. 2° 6 Alaska's fair housing law, for example, made it
unlawful "to refuse to sell, lease, or rent ... real property to a
person because of marital ... status." 207 The landlords sued
the Executive Director of the Alaska State Commission on Hu-

201. See generally Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d
692, 714-17 (9th Cir. 1999), opinion withdrawn on grant of reh'g by Thomas v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999).
202. Id. at 696. There was no apparent dispute about the sincerity of their
beliefs. See id. The court cited certain passages of the Bible as support for its
view of their credibility. See id. at 696 n.2 (citing, e.g., Genesis 2:24). As discussed below, this may have established the landlords' sincere "belief'-but
does it also establish that leasing real property is an exercise of that "belief?"
203. Thomas and Baker were not married to each other. Baker's husband,
Gary Baker, elected not to proceed with the litigation before the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. See id. at 696 n.1.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 696.
206. See id. at 697 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240(1) (Michie 1998) and
ANCHORAGE ALASKA MUN. CODE § 5.20.020(A)).

207. Id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240(1)).
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man Rights, the Anchorage Equal Rights Commission and the
Municipality of Anchorage seeking prospective declaratory and
injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §
2201.208 They claimed that enforcement of the various antidiscrimination laws would violate their free exercise rights and
their rights under RFRA.20 9 The United States District Court
for the District of Alaska, on cross-motions for summary judgment, held, among other things, that the landlords' claims were
ripe for review, and that Alaska's antidiscrimination laws violated the landlords' free exercise rights.2 10 The Equal Rights
Commission appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit began its substantive analysis with a review of Employment Division v.
Smith,2 11 which announced that the right to free exercise of religion did not relieve an individual of the duty to comply with
an otherwise valid and "neutral" law of general application. 2 12
208. See id. at 697.
209. See id. at 697 n.4. The opinion noted that the district court for the
District of Alaska found for the landlords under both the Free Exercise Clause
and RFRA. See id. The intercession of Boerne, however, see infra notes 30717 and accompanying text, eliminated the use of RFRA against state laws
such as Alaska's fair housing laws.
210. See Thomas, 165 F.3d at 717. The opinion considered the claims of the
landlords to be "ripe," since the landlords had "concrete plans'" to violate the
antidiscrimination laws and there was therefore a "'reasonable threat" of
prosecution. Id. at 698 (citing San Diego Gun Rights Comm'n v. Reno, 98 F.3d
1121, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 1996)). It apparently did not matter to the Thomas
court that the Alaska housing and equal opportunity authorities had never
even "heard of-much less prosecuted-the landlords. See id. at 718 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
211. See id. at 700. (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
212. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-82. "Neutrality" is a complex and loaded
term. For most professional readers, an extended discussion of the contours of
"neutrality" would be redundant or boring; for non-professionals, it would
likely be incoherent. Professor Laycock has noted that "[those who think neutrality is meaningless have a point. We can agree on the principle of neutrality without having agreed on anything at all." Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and DisaggregatedNeutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV.
993, 994 (1990). He notes, by way of example, that in Texas Monthly, Inc. v.
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 13 (1988), Justice Brennan and Justice Scalia "fundamentally disagreed of almost every issue in the case, but they both claimed to be
neutral. Both of them used the word 'neutrality,' but neither of them defined
it." Laycock, supra, at 994 (footnote omitted). Yet Professor Laycock is also
correct that neutrality has "aspirational" value, that we generally want to believe that a state separated from church can still nourish religion without
preference or entanglement. This is, of course, a difficult proposition, well beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the
Establishment Clause: The Case Against DiscretionaryAccommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555 (1991).
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Thus, the Thomas court noted that religious claimants were not
ordinarily entitled to free exercise exemptions because "most
burdens on religious liberty are not direct and intentional, but
rather the largely unintended incident of neutral, generally applicable regulations. 2 13 But, the Thomas court reasoned,
Smith also suggested certain exceptions to its "generally applicable" rule. One, the "hybrid rights" exception, would enable
the court to find an exemption for the landlords if they asserted
their free exercise
claim "in conjunction" with another constitu21 4
tional right.
How did leasing real estate satisfy the first half of the hybrid fights equation? It is not clear. The Thomas court, like
the Young court, largely deferred to the landlords' assertion
that leasing real estate was entitled to First Amendment protection. Their "beliefs regarding fornication," the court reasoned, "are firmly rooted in both Biblical text and in the commentaries of respected Christian theologians." 2 15
These
"beliefs" forced the landlords to make a "Hobson's Choice of
sorts between (1) violating their religious beliefs by renting to
unmarrieds (2) suffering punishment for refusing to rent to
unmarried couples, and (3) forsaking their livelihoods as
apartment owners altogether."21 6 This choice, the court ultimately concluded, was much like the untenable choice that was
struck in Sherbert between working on the Sabbath or receiv217
ing unemployment benefits.
Before reaching this conclusion, however, the court of appeals had to pass two hurdles that face a religious actor seeking
an exemption for seemingly commercial conduct proscribed by a
law of general application. First, the court had to bypass
United States v. Lee, which observed that if one "enter[s] into
commercial activity as a matter of choice," one's religious be-

213. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 700 (footnote omitted).
214. See id. at 702.
215. Id. at 696 (footnote omitted).
216. Id. at 712.
217. See id. at 713. In fact, it appears that the choice was more like that
held to be constitutionally permissible in Braunfeld v. Brown, where Saturday
Sabbatarians were denied the right to open shop on Sunday. 366 U.S. 599,
601, 609 (1961); see also supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text. Like the
Jews in Braunfeld, the landlords were not, in fact, "compelled" to do anything.
In Sherbert, by contrast, the claimant was affirmatively required to work on
Saturday in order to be eligible for unemployment benefits. See Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402, 406-09 (1963); see also infra text accompanying
notes 250-64.
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liefs "are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes
which are binding on others in that activity."218 Second, the
court had to evade the force of Alamo, which announced that
religion does not include "commercial enterprises" that (i)
"serve the general public," and (ii) compete with "ordinary
commercial enterprises." 21 9
According to Thomas, Lee would support (or at least not
undermine) the conclusion that leasing real property was a religious exercise. The Thomas court reasoned that Lee did consider the refusal to participate in the social security system an
exercise of religion because Lee "[sieemingly assum[ed] that the
burden" on the Amish of complying with the social security system "was substantial."220 This assumption amounted to a conclusion that the activity (or untenable choice) was a religious
exercise.
Here, the Thomas court missed a crucial point. On a careful reading, it appears that Lee simply deferred to the religious
claimants' characterization of their activity as religious exercise. 22 1 Lee did not independently analyze the underlying
transactions, as the Court has otherwise done when confronting the overlap of religious exercise and commerce. This may
be explained as a function of the absence of third parties. One
could argue that, like Lee, there were no private third parties in
Thomas. Both cases involved only the government defending a
statute that may or may not be sufficiently important to warrant a religious exemption. Yet one could also argue that Thomas, unlike Lee, does involve third parties. Alaska's fair
housing statutes presumably exist to eliminate discrimination
in the housing market. By definition, discrimination always
harms private third parties. 222 The social security system,
218. 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
219. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 299
(1985) (citing Donovan v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 567 F. Supp. 566, 573,
(W.D. Ark. 1982); Donovan v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 722 F.2d 397, 400
(8th Cir. 1983)).
220. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 692, 712 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 257 (1982)).
221. See Lee, 455 U.S. at 257. The Lee court reasoned that "[i]t is not
within 'the judicial function and judicial competence'... to determine whether
[the Amish] or the Government has the proper interpretation of the Amish
faith; '[courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.'" Id. (quoting
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indep. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716

(1981)).
222. See Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions,
46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1520 (1999) (noting in a discussion about discrimina-
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which was at issue in Lee, involves all (or most) of us. It is difficult to characterize a system of that magnitude as being for
the protection of an identifiable third party.
Even if Thomas' reliance on Lee is defensible, its use of
Alamo is not. The Thomas court simply assumed that Alamo
did not "support a per se (or even presumptive) rule that burdens levied in commercial contexts are not constitutionally substantial."223 That, too, may be true but also misses the point. If
there is a correlation between the nature of an activity and the
presence of third parties, as suggested by Alamo and others,
then the Thomas court had a duty to analyze the activities in
question independently. It would seem a matter of simple intuition that leasing real property is more like running service
stations (held not to be a religious exercise in Alamo) than the
Amish prohibition on participating in the social security system
(which was impliedly considered to be a religious exercise in
Lee).
Thomas deferred more deeply to a claim of religious exercise than had ever been acceptable when such deference
threatened to harm third parties. In doing so, the Thomas
court eschewed the hard work of distinguishing religion from
commerce and simply accepted the religious claimants' own
characterization of their beliefs and the harms that would befall them should they be denied an exemption. While this level
of deference may be appropriate when third parties are not involved, the Supreme Court has not-and should not-permit
such deference when third parties are directly or indirectly
threatened by the putative exercise of religion.
Some may defend Thomas on the grounds that it does not
treat acting as a landlord as an exercise of religion. Rather,
like Sherbert, the Thomas court simply refused to subject the
landlords to an "untenable choice." There are several ready responses. First, the Constitution does not prohibit the imposition of "untenable choices"--it forbids the government from
tion laws that "[tihe reason for most restrictions on conduct is precisely that
people think the conduct does harm others"). Professor Volokh acknowledges
that the issue is less whether there is harm than "who ultimately defines what
constitutes infringement of the private rights of others... " Id. at 1520-21
(quotation marks omitted). As discussed below, the problem with Thomas is
that, by treating the activity of landlord as a form of religious exercise cloaked
in strict scrutiny, the court of appeals failed to take seriously its obligation to
balance either side of the equation.
223. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 712 (citing Attorney General v. Desilets, 636
N.E.2d 233, 238 (Mass. 1994) (applying Massachusetts' state constitution)).
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prohibiting the "free exercise" of "religion." Second, untenable
choice is rarely a basis for granting a free exercise exemption in
the Supreme Court. In Braunfeld,Alamo, Lee and Hernandez,
for example, the Court held that the untenable choices between
religious exercise and complying with Sunday closing laws, labor laws, social security regulations and the United States tax
code, respectively, were not grounds for exemptions from those
laws.
Third, even if an "untenable choice" is a permissible basis
for granting a religious liberty exemption when the dispute is
limited to religious actors and the state, a different analysis
should apply when third parties would suffer. The source of
the untenable choice test, Sherbert, is easily distinguishable
from Thomas on these grounds. It does not appear that third
parties were directly harmed by recognizing an exemption in
Sherbert. The party in interest there was the government, as
provider of unemployment benefits. 224 In Thomas, by contrast,
the exemption from Alaska's fair housing statutes had a direct
and harmful effect on private third parties by limiting their
market choice on an impermissible basis.
Fourth, Thomas offers no limiting principle. Would the
Thomas court have come to a different result if, instead of unmarried couples, the landlords sought to discriminate against
African-Americans or Jews? What if Irish Catholic landlords
sought to discriminate against Protestant tenants? The Ninth
Circuit offered no principled basis for distinguishing these untenable choices from that sanctioned in the Thomas decision.
Rather, like Young, Thomas deferred deeply to the landlords'
claim that leasing real property was a religious exercise entitled to First Amendment protection.
Perhaps these problems led the Ninth Circuit to withdraw
the Thomas opinion. 225 As of this writing, the case has been
scheduled for rehearing en banc after publication of this Article. If the rehearing panel takes seriously the judicial duty to

224. It is, of course, conceivable that large-scale employment exemptions
could harm third parties in a variety of ways, including loss of productivity to
employers, increased unemployment insurance premiums, etc. In Sherbert,
however, such harm appeared not to be a realistic problem. Indeed, the Court
noted that the state did not even raise the issue. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
225. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th
Cir. 1999).
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consider third-party harms, perhaps it will consider whether,
and if so how, leasing real property was an exercise of religion.
II. BALANCING HARMS AND THE ANXIETY OF
ANARCHY
Wholly apart from the question of how, if at all, courts may
define "religion," there remains the question of how courts will
protect that which satisfies the definition. In broadest terms,
courts have articulated two different forms of protection for religious liberty, the "strong"2 26 and the "weak." The strong
form-or rhetoric suggestive of the strong form-enjoyed Supreme Court favor from 1940 to 1990. Since the 1990 Smith
decision, protection for religious liberty has eroded to a weaker
form, at least when "neutral" laws of general application prohibit an exercise of religion. Congress, state legislatures and
lower federal courts have responded with various strategies for
providing the greatest possible protection for religious libertyeven when that protection may incidentally harm third parties.
This Part discusses the role that judicial balancing plays in
protecting religious liberty. Judicial balancing was a central
feature of strong protection. While Smith is generally viewed
as having weakened protection for religious actors, that case
also eliminated judicial balancing. If the Young and Thomas
cases are any indication, then by stripping courts of the power
to balance harms in religious liberty disputes, Smith unwittingly created the very anarchy it sought to contain.
A. STRONG PROTECTION-BALANCING HARMS PLUS STRICT

JUDICIAL SCRUTINY
Strong protection for religious liberty is generally understood as strict judicial scrutiny of laws that substantially burden religious exercise. The legal community tends to assume
that this level of protection for religious liberty has its roots in
the 1963 Sherbert v. Verner decision. 227 Generally speaking,
this makes sense, because Sherbert merged the two components
of prior case law that created this level of protection: (i) a judi226. I appreciate the irony of this characterization. Many have argued
persuasively that the "strong" standard articulated in Sherbert was "feeble in
fact." Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 446-47
(1994).
227. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Indeed, Sherbert, but not its predecessors, forms
the basis of RFRA.
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cial balancing of the harm caused by enforcing a law against
the harm caused by exempting a religious actor from it, plus (ii)
a presumption that "substantial burdens" on religion require
very good ("compelling") state interests as justification. 228 In
simple terms, Sherbert's test implied both a "scale" and a
"thumb" on the scale, weighing in favor of religious actors. Yet
if strong protection for religious liberty requires courts to balance harms, then the roots of such protection pre-date Sherbert
by more than twenty years, and can be found in the Court's
229
1940 decision, Cantwell v. Connecticut.
1. The Roots of Balancing-The Religious Solicitation Cases
Cantwell and his two sons were Jehovah's Witnesses who
had been arrested for going door-to-door with books, pamphlets
and phonograph records about the Jehovah's Witnesses. 230 Although they may have been a nuisance to New Haven's Catholics, the Cantwells caused little legally cognizable harm. Nevertheless, their activity violated Connecticut's antisolicitation
statute, which provided that "'[nlo person shall solicit
money.., for any alleged religious, charitable or philanthropic
cause, from other than a member of the organization for whose
benefit such person is soliciting... unless such cause shall
have been approved by the secretary of the public welfare council. 1'2 3 1 Violators could expect to pay a fine of $100 or spend
thirty days in jail.
The Court began its analysis by exploring the longrecognized (but textually troubling)232 distinction between (protected) "belief' and (unprotected) "conduct" that emanated from
Reynolds v. United States233 and Davis v. Beason.234 These
cases held that Mormons could be criminally prosecuted (or
discriminated against) for polygamous marriage because such
"conduct" was beyond the scope of the First Amendment. 235 In
an important act of reversal-by-distinction, a unanimous Court
228. See generallySherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-09.
229. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
230. See id. at 300.
231. Id. at 302 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6294 (Supp. 1937)).
232. See McConnell, supra note 5, at 1114-16.
233. 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
234. 133 U.S. 333, 338 (1890).
235. See Davis, 133 U.S. at 338-40; Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166 ("Laws are
made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere
religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.").
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held that, while government could regulate religious conduct
("exercise"), it could not do so in Cantwell. The First Amendment, Justice Roberts wrote, "embraces two concepts,-freedom
to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the
nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulationfor the protectionof society."236
By exempting the Cantwells from Connecticut's antisolicitation statute, the Cantwell Court held that the state cannot always, absolutely limit religious conduct. Instead, courts
would have to balance the need for a regulation against the religious interests of the claimant. 237 "In every case," the Court
held, "the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected
freedom. 2 38 Yet Cantwell also recognized that the "state" was
not an end in itself, but merely a means to protect individuals
from harm. '"The general regulation, in the public interest, of
solicitation, which does not involve any religious test and does
not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is
,139
not open to any constitutional objection ....
Later solicitation cases use Cantwell's analysis, too. Simi242
lar balancing appears in Ballard,240 Murdock, 24 1 and Follett,
all of which concluded that religious exercise in violation of a
generally applicable law regulating solicitation outweighed the
harm of enforcing such laws. Ballard, for example, concluded
that the government could not prosecute Guy Ballard for mail
fraud for claiming that he had been selected as a "divine messenger.2 43 Even if these representations were made "With the
intention.., to cheat, wrong, and defraud persons, and to obtain.., money, property, and other things of value,"244 the
harm to third parties was tolerable if the representations were
"religious" in nature.245 Similarly, in Murdock and Follett, the
236. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145 (1878); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890)) (emphasis added).
237. Cf Gressman & Carmella, supra note 25, at 78 (discussing "signals of
movement toward" balancing "as early as 1940").
238. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304.
239. Id. at 305.
240. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1944).
241. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110-17 (1943).
242. See Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 576-78 (1944).
243. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 79, 86.
244. Id. at 80.
245. See id. at 86 ("[We do not agree that the truth or verity of [defendants'] religious doctrines or beliefs should have been submitted to the
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Court appears to have concluded that selling religious pamphlets door-to-door, while perhaps obnoxious to some, was not
so harmful as to require the Jehovah's Witnesses in those cases
to comply with state licensing procedures applicable to other
246
door-to-door merchants.
The religious solicitation cases suggest that the judicial
duty to balance harms results in part from concern about thirdparty harm caused by religious exercise. 247 Balancing harms is
an appropriate judicial method for determining the limits of
religious conduct, especially when such conduct may harm
third parties. Rather than subordinating all religious conduct
to laws of general application (or vice versa), these cases suggest that enforcement of, or exemption from, a law should be
determined by reference to the effect such decisions have on
third parties.
2. Strict Scrutiny-A Thumb on the Scale
While Cantwell and Ballard held that courts could-and
perhaps should-balance the harm of enforcement against the
harm of exemption, they failed to say whether, or how, the
scales should be set in the first place. 248 Although, at the time
of Cantwell, the Court had already announced the use of

jury.... 'The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no
dogma, the establishment of no sect." (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 679, 728 (1871))).
246. See Follett, 321 U.S. at 577; Murdock, 319 U.S. at 108-09. Another
solicitation case, Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), raised similar issues.
There, the State of Minnesota required religious organizations that received
more than half of their total contributions from non-members to register with
the Minnesota Department of Commerce before soliciting contributions in the
state of Minnesota. See Larson, 456 U.S. at 231 (citing MINN. STAT. § 309.52
(1969 & Supp. 1982)). The Court struck these provisions under the Establishment Clause as effectively singling out the Unification Church, giving denominational preference to other, better established religions. See id. at 246.
The Court, per Justice Brennan, acknowledged that "the State of Minnesota
has a significant interest in protecting its citizens from abusive practices in
the solicitation of funds for charity ...."Id. at 248. Minnesota's fifty percent
rule, however, was not sufficiently "closely fitted" to this legislative goal to justify the preference in fundraising it effectively gave to some religious groups.
Id. at 255. Protecting third parties, in other words, was a basis for balancing
harms, even if the Court would not necessarily find such harm a basis for upholding a law.
247. Other concerns evident in these cases include the rights to speech, expression and association contained in the First Amendment.
248. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of
Balancing,96 YALE L.J. 943, 943-44 (1987).
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"heightened" scrutiny in certain cases, 24 9 it appears that no
thumb rested on the scales. There was, in other words, balancing, but no apparent presumption that the religious activity
at issue should enjoy the strong protection of strict scrutiny.
Strict scrutiny-a thumb on the scale-was first applied to
free exercise cases in Sherbert v. Verner, 50° where the Court
held that the state was required to show a compelling interest
in denying unemployment benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist
church member who was ineligible for work due to religious observance requirements. 25 1 The First Amendment claimant in
Sherbert argued that denying her unemployment benefits violated her free exercise rights. The Court agreed. The Sherbert
Court reasoned that denying unemployment benefits impermissibly burdened the claimant's free exercise rights by causing her to forego a benefit if she chose to follow the dictates of
her religion. 252 The fact that the unemployment benefits involved were a "privilege" instead of a "right" was insufficient to
overcome the constitutional problems arising from denial of
these benefits, particularly when the ultimate reason was the
claimant's religious beliefs.253 To the contrary, "[glovernmental
imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon
the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against ap25 4
pellant for her Saturday worship."
The Sherbert Court did not intend to create unlimited free
exercise rights. Religious conduct could be limited under Sherbert where it "posed some substantial threat to public safety,
peace or order."255 Thus, the Court cited and distinguished
249. The levels-of-scrutiny approach was first suggested in United States v.
CaroleneProducts Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938), in which the Court recognized that certain rights would receive increased judicial protection in the
form of a "more searching judicial inquiry."
250. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
251. See id. at 406-09.
252. See id. at 404.
253. See id. at 404-06.
254. Id. at 404. This analogy seems strained in light of the fact that unemployment benefits were in question. A fine implies that the state took something from Sherbert for exercising her right to worship. But the state provided benefits to which she was entitled notwithstanding the observance
requirements of her religion.
255. Id. at 403 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946)). It is not clear how
the polygamy forbidden in Reynolds-which presumably involved consensual
marriages among adults-threatened "public safety, peace or order." Id. (em-
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Braunfeld, which had refused to exempt Saturday Sabbatarians from Sunday closing laws 256 out of concern for harm to
third parties. Braunfeld reasoned that "[riequiring exemptions
[from Sunday closing laws] for Sabbatarians, while theoretically possible, appeared.., to afford the exempted class so
great a competitive advantage, that such a requirement would
have rendered the entire statutory scheme unworkable." 2 7 The
harm to third parties of exemption in Sherbert,by contrast, was
negligible.258 While granting exemptions from the unemployment rules could lead to fraudulent claims or interfere with
employer scheduling, the Court reasoned that this harm was
[this] substantial innot sufficiently plausible "to warrant
59
fringement of religious liberties."2
The effect of Sherbert was to treat religious practices that
were especially important to the individual as a substantive
right beyond regulation.260 As with the jurisprudence of many
other constitutional provisions, such as the Free Speech
Clause, the Sherbert-era constitutional exemption framework
was a complex body of law, with not one but several tests in
practice, none especially rigorous. Thus, when the government
acted as prison administrator or as employer of military personnel, little weight was given to the claims of the religious actor; judicial scrutiny was closer to a rational basis test than to
the "strict" scrutiny announced in Sherbert.261 When the govphasis added).
256. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606-07 (1961).
257. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 408-09 (citing Note, State Sunday Laws and the
Religious Guarantees of the Federal Constitution, 73 HARV. L. REV. 729, 74145 (1960)).
258. This is not a terribly persuasive argument. Closing on Saturdays
would have deprived Jews of a significant amount of business, which they may
or may not have made up if permitted to open on Sunday. If one believes, as
the Braunfeld Court claimed to believe, that Sunday closing laws reflected the
otherwise legitimate and "secular" desire to have a "day of rest," then presumably most shoppers would have been resting on Sunday, anyway. Sunday
Sabbatarians would therefore have lost little business and suffered little
harm. Nevertheless, it was reasonable to believe that some business would
have been lost, and such loss would have resulted in some third-party harm.
259. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
260. See Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious FreedomRestorationAct, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 885 (1994).
261. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987) (applying
the rational basis standard to prison regulations which hindered the petitioners' ability to attend religious services); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,
510 (1986) (applying the rational basis standard to military regulations which
forbade the petitioner from wearing a yarmulke); see also Ira C. Lupu, Of Time
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ernment was acting as employer, some lower courts likewise
adopted fairly (but not entirely) deferential tests. 262 There was
no agreed-on test for the government acting as grammar school
educator, but courts at least had the option of concluding that
the free exercise test-like the free speech test-should be relatively deferential in such cases, too.2 63 In short, even the
"strong" protection afforded under the Free Exercise Clause
was anything more than "feeble."264
B. WEAK PROTECTION-SMITH AND THE END OF BALANCING
In 1990, troubled by the potentially anarchic effect of
strong protection for religious liberty and the erratic use of
strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause, the Court abandoned strong protection for religious liberty in the controversial
Smith decision. 265 In announcing that religious actors were not
exempt from neutral laws of general application, no matter the
harm they suffered, the Court effectively held that, at least as a
constitutional matter, courts had no obligation to balance
harms in the free exercise context. Rather than lifting the
thumb, Smith threw out the scales.

and the RFRA. A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious Freedom RestorationAct, 56
MONT. L. REV. 171, 191-98 (1995).
262. See, e.g., Baz v. Walters, 782 F.2d 701, 708 (7th Cir. 1986); Philadelphia Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, 599 F. Supp. 254, 258 (E.D. Pa. 1984)
(mem.); Doherty v. Wilson, 356 F. Supp. 35, 40 (M.D. Ga. 1973); Barlow v.
Blackburn, 798 P.2d 1360, 1366 (Ariz. 1990).
263. Compare Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1073
(6th Cir. 1987) (Boggs, J., concurring), with, e.g., Spence v. Bailey, 465 F.2d
797, 800 (6th Cir. 1972), and Moody v Cronin, 484 F. Supp. 270, 277 (C.D. Ill.
1979).
264. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 226, at 446-47. Professor Steven
Smith has argued that during the Sherbert era, balancing by the Supreme
Court was illusory, since the Court did not view the disputes in, for example,
Yoder as involving true conflicts of ends, but only of means. See Steven D.
Smith, Free Exercise Doctrine and the Discourse of Disrespect, 65 U. COLO. L.
REV. 519, 529-31 (1994). Thus, Yoder evaded the obligation to balance harms
because the Amish were viewed as proxy for the state in satisfying the legislative goal of educating children. It is interesting to consider whether Yoder
would have produced the same result if, instead of seeking an exemption from
compulsory education, the Amish in that case sought to engage in conduct that
could have harmed third parties, for instance, driving slow-moving vehicles
without proper warning signs. Under the constitutions of Wisconsin and Minnesota, the Amish have been exempted from such requirements. See, e.g.,
State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Minn. 1990); Miller v. State, 549
N.W.2d 235, 242 (Wis. 1996).
265. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
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The claimants in Smith were fired from their jobs at a private drug rehabilitation center because they ingested the hallucinogenic drug peyote while attending a religious ceremony 266
of
the Native American Church in violation of Oregon law.
When they applied for unemployment compensation benefits,
the state denied their request on the grounds that they had lost
their jobs because of work-related misconduct. 267 The claimants sued, alleging that the Oregon law denying their claim
violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. Although
the Oregon Supreme Court agreed with the claimants, 268 the
United States Supreme Court did not. Instead, it held that the
right to free exercise did not relieve an individual of the duty to
comply with an otherwise valid and "neutral" law of general
269
application.
To make an individual's obligation to obey such a [neutral and
generally applicable] law contingent upon the law's coincidence with
his religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is "compelling"-permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, "to become a law unto
himself'...
contradicts both constitutional tradition and common
270
sense.

The Smith Court justified its conclusion by reference to the
inconsistent application of strict scrutiny in free exercise cases.
The Court reasoned that there was little, outside the employment context as it applied to the free exercise of religion, that
was not considered a compelling state interest.27 1 Thus, notwithstanding the complaints of religious adherents to the contrary, the Court had found "compelling" government interests
in maintaining the tax system,27 2 preserving national secu275
rity,27 3 ensuring public safety, 27 4 providing public education,
27 6
and enforcing participation in the social security system.

266. See id. at 874. The drug rehabilitation center where the claimants
worked had a no-tolerance rule for its employees. During the state court proceedings, one of their supervisors testified that employees would similarly
have been dismissed had they taken wine during Catholic Mass.
267. See id.
268. See Smith v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 445, 450-51 (Or. 1986).
269. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
270. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 167 (1878)).
271. See id. at 877-79. The Court did not explain why or whether this distinction mattered. Nor did it explain, given that Smith was also an employment case, why the Court should not be bound by its precedent in that area.
Presumably, the illegality of ingesting peyote justified the distinction.
272. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1988).
273. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971).
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Smith ended judicial balancing as a means of resolving
contests between neutral laws of general application and religious claimants seeking exemptions from those laws. 277 According to Smith, the only role for courts is to determine
whether a law is neutral and generally applicable. If so, the
harm to the religious claimant is irrelevant. Yet, by eliminating balancing, Smith unwittingly set the stage for the very anarchy it sought to prevent. If there is no basis to balance
harms in contests with neutral and generally applicable laws,
then any effective exemption could be absolute. 2 78 The harms
suffered by third parties could be as immaterial as the harms
suffered by religious claimants.
Smith has been the subject of massive and largely hostile
criticism.279 While criticizing the decision may no longer be
274. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1944).
275. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972).
276. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258 (1982).
277. See Gressman & Carmella, supra note 25, at 73-74 ("A major theme of
the Smith opinion.., is that the balancing of competing interests is a function
better left to the legislative bodies." (footnote omitted)); id. at 86 ("Smith rejected the balancing approach for generally applicable, facially neutral
laws. ... ").

278. Professor Steven D. Smith has argued that even before Smith, the
Court never really "balanced" competing interests in the religious liberty context. See Smith, supra note 264, at 530-31. As discussed below, to the extent
this is true, it is an argument for using equity jurisprudence as the basis for
balancing harms in this context.
279. See, e.g., John Delaney, Police Power Absolutism and Nullifying the
Free Exercise Clause: A Critique of Oregon v. Smith, 25 IND. L. REV. 71, 75
(1991) (arguing that Smith "violates core principles expressed in our theory of
just punishment within a framework of constitutional criminal law"); James
D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91, 114-15
(1991) (contending that Smith 'depublished' the Free Exercise Clause");
Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court'sAssault on Free Exercise, and the Amicus Brief that Was Never Filed, 8 J.L. & RELIGION 99, 102 (1990) (explaining
that Smith was "inconsistent with the original intent, inconsistent with the
constitutional text, inconsistent with doctrine under other constitutional
clauses, and inconsistent with precedent"); Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division
v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism,1993 BYU L. REV. 259,
260 (describing Smith as "substantively wrong and institutionally irresponsible"); McConnell, supra note 5, at 1120 (stating that Smith's "use of precedent
is troubling, bordering on the shocking"); Roald Mykkeltvedt, Employment Division v. Smith: CreatingAnxiety by Relieving Tension, 58 TENN. L. REV. 603,
621 (1991); Smith, supra note 264, at 575 (criticizing the majoritarian "intolerance" reflected in Smith). Not all scholars have disparaged the Smith decision. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, The Belief/Conduct Paradigmin the Supreme Court's Free Exercise Jurisprudence: A Theological Account of the
Failureto ProtectReligious Conduct, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 749 (1993) ("Smith
is not radically different from its forerunners ....

"); Marci A. Hamilton, The
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"original or useful,"280 it remains important to understand the
contours of religious liberty jurisprudence after Smith. As indicated by City of Boerne v. Flores, weak protection for religious
liberty remains the posture of the Court. While most attention
on Smith has focused on the weakness of the protection it affords religious actors, it would appear that Smith has also created exceptions through which strong protection survives.
C. SMITH'S EXCEPTIONS--HYBRID RIGHTS AND LEGISLATION

Smith suggested that there were three exceptions to the
"generally applicable" rule it announced: (i) "hybrid-rights"-a
combination of free exercise and other constitutional rights; (ii)
legislation expanding protection for religious actors, and (iii)
legislation that, by virtue of its underinclusiveness, shows impermissible state hostility to religious actors. 281 Laws protecting third parties, including common law doctrines of tort, contract, property, agency, etc, are typically generally applicable,
and therefore not "underinclusive." For that reason, I do not
discuss the "underinclusiveness" exception here.
1. Hybrid Rights
To dodge the force of strict scrutiny precedent, such as
Cantwell, Sherbert and Yoder, Smith "conveniently discovered"282 what has come to be known as the "hybrid rights" exception. "The only decisions in which we have held that the
First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not
the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in
conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press,.., or the right of parents.., to
direct the education of their children .... ,123 In other words,
ConstitutionalRhetoric of Religion, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 619, 619
(1998) (arguing that Smith represents a "more accurate and vital image of religion" than RFRA); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 309 (1991).
280. Lupu, supra note 279, at 269.
281. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877, 881-82, 890 (1990).
In the Lukumi case, the Court used strict scrutiny to strike a facially neutral
city ordinance forbidding ritual slaughter because its underinclusive scope had
the effect of impermissibly targeting the Santeria religion. See Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546-47 (1993).
282. James M. Donovan, Restoring Free Exercise Protections By Limiting
Them: Preventinga Repeat of Smith, 17 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 45 n.18 (1996).
283. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. This assertion, of course, is facially wrong,
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the Smith Court suggested, strong protection for religious liberty was really protection for religious liberty plus some other
liberty interest.
Smith alluded to two classes of hybrid, those involving
First Amendment rights to speech, association and press, on
the one hand, and a parent's Fourteenth Amendment right to
control a child's education, on the other.284 Yet the viability
and strength of the exception are unclear. Can other constitutional rights (under the federal or state constitutions) also conjoin with a free exercise claim to create a religious exemption to
a generally applicable law? Until the Thomas case, 285 it was
not clear whether a hybrid rights claim could include a Fifth
286
Amendment property claim.
Nor is the result of a hybrid-rights exception clear. Smith
failed to say which of the several possible standards of review
should be used in a hybrid rights claim. Should the scales be
evenly set, as in Cantwell, or should there be a presumption in
favor of religious claimants, as in Sherbert? The cases on which
Smith relied-Cantwell, Murdock, Follett, Pierce v. Society of
28 7
Sisters and Yoder--did not use a single standard of review.
As discussed above, Cantwell, for example, did not employ the
classic form of "strict scrutiny" which gives "strong" protection
to religious liberty. Cantwell recognized the need to balance
harms, but failed to say how the scales should be set in the first
place. Murdock and Follett relied on something resembling
strict scrutiny, but in an early form, saying simply that religion, like speech and press, is in a "preferred position."2 88 Pierce
unless one believes that Sherbert, too, involved a second, protected liberty interest.
284. See id. at 882. Professor McConnell has noted that this may have
been a rather disingenuous statement by the Court. See McConnell, supra
note 5, at 1120-21. On this logic, Wisconsin v. Yoder would have been wrong,
since the adherents in that case had no independent constitutional right to
withhold their children from school.
285. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 704-05
(9th Cir. 1999), opinion withdrawn on grant of reh'g by Thomas v. Anchorage
Equal Rights Comm'n, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999).
286. See generally Steckler v. United States, Civ. A. No. 96-1054, 1998 WL
28235, at *1-2 (E.D. La. Jan. 26, 1998) (rejecting a hybrid rights claim including takings under the Fifth Amendment); Peter M. Stein, Smith v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission: Does the Right to Exclude, Combined with
Religious Freedom, Present a "HybridSituation"under Employment Division
v. Smith, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 141 (1995).

287. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
288. Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 577 (1944); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
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arose long before Carolene Products, the case that is generally
viewed as having introduced the levels-of-scrutiny approach. 28 9
Yoder used something resembling the strong formulation enun290
ciated in Sherbert.
Finally, it is not clear how hybrid rights should be calculated. Does Smith announce a rule of synergy, whereby "two
loser constitutional claims = one winner constitutional
claim."291 If so, what is the textual source of this synergy? If
Cantwell, Yoder, and the other "hybrid" precedent cited in
Smith, do not turn on non-free exercise grounds (e.g., speech),
what made the "other" claims (speech and parental control) losers? 292 Or, as Justice Souter pointed out in Lukumi, 293 is the
"other" claim one in which a litigant would have obtained an
exemption from a generally applicable law, anyway? If so,
"there would have been no reason for the Court in what Smith
calls hybrid cases to have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause
at all."294 Nor does Smith explain why employment cases-the
sole context in which free exercise claims were recognized without hybrid rights2 95-were not controlling. 296 Although the hybrid-rights theory has been scorned as "make-weight," 297 "untenable,"298 "unartful,"299 "'strained'"300 and "without any
289. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(recognizing that certain rights would receive increased judicial protection in
the form of a "more searching judicial inquiry")
290. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
291. William L. Esser, IV, Religious Hybrids in the Lower Courts: Free Exercise Plus or ConstitutionalSmokescreen?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211, 242
(1998); see also Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692,
705-07 (9th Cir. 1999), opinion withdrawn on grant of reh'g by Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing the
hybrid rights exception to fair housing laws where religious landlords had
"colorable" free exercise and Fifth Amendment claims).
292. Cf. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of America, 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (holding that proper hybrid rights claims must be independently viable);
Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995)
(same).
293. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
559 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring).
294. Id. at 567.
295. See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 835
(1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 140-41
(1987); Thomas v. Review Bd.of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 719
(1981).
296. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990).
297. Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 Sup. CT. REv. 323, 335.
298. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 567 (Souter, J., concurring).
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constitutionally limiting principle,"3 0 it was most notably used
from
in Thomas, where the court exempted religious landlords
302
the obligation to comply with Alaska's fair housing laws.
2. RFRA
In addition to hybrid-rights, Smith also suggested that
legislation might be another way around the rule that religious
actors are subject to laws of general application. Acting on this
suggestion, Congress passed and President Clinton signed
RFRA in 1993 in an attempt to restore both judicial balancing
and the presumption imposed by strict scrutiny-the scales and
the thumb-for religious liberty claims. The operative provisions of RFRA are expressed in section 3, which provides:
(a) In General-Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b).
(b) Exception-Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest." 3

RFRA has two goals: "(1) to restore the compelling interest
test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner ... and Wisconsin v. Yoder... and to guarantee its application in all cases where free
exercise of religion is substantially burdened"; and "(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is
substantially burdened by government." 3°4 Assuming religion
has been identified, 30 5 the key inquiries under RFRA are
(i) whether the governmental action in question substantially
299. Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word: The Implications for RFRA and Separationof Powers, 56 MONT. L. REV. 5, 30 (1995).

300. Esser, supra note 291, at 240 (citation omitted).
301. Id. (citation omitted).
302. See Thomas v. Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999),
opinion withdrawn on grant of reh'g by Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights

Comm'n, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999).
303. 42 U.S.c. § 2000bb-1 (1994).
304. Id. § 2000bb(b)(2).
305. As discussed above, see supra text accompanying notes 23-52, while it
is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to "define" religion, there are good reasons
to try to form a definition. How can a court protect a right if it does not know
the basis of the right? RFRA avoids the problem, containing no definition of
religion. RFRA instead defers to First Amendment case law on the question.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (defining the exercise of religion to mean the exercise of religion under the First Amendment).
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burdens a person's religious practice, and (ii) if so, whether the
statute's burdens further a compelling government interest in
the least restrictive manner possible. 30 6
RFRA was soon challenged and, at least as applied to state
law, was held invalid, in City of Boerne v. Flores.30 7 In Boerne,
the Catholic Archbishop of San Antonio applied for a building
permit to enlarge a church in Boerne, Texas. When local zoning authorities denied the permit, relying on an ordinance governing historic preservation in a district which, they argued,
included the church, the Archbishop sued, challenging the
permit denial under RFRA.30 8 In reversing the Fifth Circuit,
the Supreme Court held that RFRA exceeded Congress's remedial powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 30 9
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy acknowledged
that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the guarantee that no state
shall make or enforce any law depriving any person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," including, by incorporation, the free exercise rights of the First Amendment. 310
RFRA, however, was a substantive change to free exercise jurisprudence that exceeded Congress's remedial powers. "Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what
the right is."3 11 Although acknowledging that "the line between
measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and
measures that make a substantive change in the governing law
is not easy to discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in
determining where it lies," the Court determined that RFRA
crossed that line because the injury to be prevented or remedied lacked sufficient congruence and proportionality to the
312
means adopted.
There are two important aspects to Boerne's holding. First,
it reaffirms Smith's "weak" protection for religious liberty.
"Strong" protection under Boerne will be limited to cases where
306. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a).
307. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
308. See Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1364 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd,
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
309. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
310. Id. at 507-08 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5).
311. Id. at 519.
312. Id. at 519-20. "RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or
preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to
prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections." Id. at 532.
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the state intentionally discriminates on the basis of religion, ei313
ther because a law was aimed at stifling a religious practice,
or because a widespread pattern of discrimination was
shown.3 14 Balancing harms, Boerne implies, is simply irrelevant. Quoting Smith, the Court reasoned that the Free Exercise Clause does not "relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on
the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that
'3 15
his religion prescribes (or proscribes).'
Second, the Boerne Court echoed Smith's anxiety of anarchy, and the potential for systemic disruption posed by broad
religious exemptions, however created. The sweeping coverage
of RFRA "ensure[d] its intrusion at every level of government,
displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every
description and regardless of subject matter."316 Although
Boerne was couched in concern for states' rights, 317 it recognized that permitting one to become one's own law could paralyze our legal system-or at least make it subordinate to the
religious convictions of all. Implicit in this concern, of course, is
anxiety about the rights of third parties.
It appears, therefore, that a majority of the Court sees no
constitutional obligation to balance the harm (to religious actors) of enforcing a law against the harm (to third parties) of
creating a free exercise exemption. By eliminating judicial balancing of harms, one would think that Smith weakened religious liberty. Yet, Young and Thomas suggest that strong protection for religious liberty is alive and well in certain
contexts-and that balancing of harms is nowhere to be found.

313. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 533 (1993) ("[A] law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible.... ").
314. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533-36.
315. Id. at 537 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990), and United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3
(1982)).
316. Id. at 532.
317. The Boerne Court characterized RFRA as "a considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and general authority
to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens." Id. at 534. This trend
appears to have its roots in United States v. Lopez. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (limiting the reach of the Commerce Clause).
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D. YOUNG AND THOMAS--STRONG PROTECTION WITHOUT

BALANCE
Stripped of the judicial method of balancing harms in contests between neutral laws of general application and claims of
religious exemption, religious claimants have taken at least
two different approaches to seek strong protection for religious
liberty.318 Young relied on RFRA;319 Thomas relied on Smith's
hybrid-rights theory.320 While both decisions share great ambition for protecting religious liberty, neither engages in the balancing of harms required by strong protection. Although it is
easy to identify the harms third parties suffer by granting
these exemptions-creditors go unpaid, marital-status discrimination is sanctioned-the Young and Thomas courts simply ignore such harms. While it may be the case that religious
exemptions should sometimes be granted in the face of such
harm, it is difficult to believe that courts have no role in determining whether religious actors cause such harm.
1. Young
In Young the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
RFRA trumped the constructive fraudulent conveyance provisions of the United States Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy
Code, like the law of every state,32 1 provides that transfers of
valuable property made while insolvent may be avoided and recovered as constructive fraudulent transfers. 322 "The purpose
of the [fraudulent transfer laws] is to preserve a debtor's assets
so that creditors may look to them in the event that the debtor
ceases payments or is declared bankrupt."323 Although an in318. As noted above, the Lukumi case also suggests a third path, if one can
show that underinclusive legislation impermissibly targets religious activity.
See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543-44; see also supra note 281 and accompanying
text.
319. See Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 141
F.3d 854, 856 (8th Cir. 1998).
320. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 702
(9th Cir. 1999), opinion withdrawn on grant of reh'g by Thomas v. Anchorage
Equal Rights Comm'n, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999).
321. Every state has enacted one of the uniform fraudulent transfer laws,
see UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, 7A U.L.A. 2 (1918); UNIF.
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, 7A U.L.A. 266 (1984), or a predecessor statute
with similar effect. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-81 (Michie 1991); An Acte
agaynst fraudulent Deedes Gyftes Alienations, &c., 1571, 13 Eliz., ch. 5
(Eng.)).
322. See 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1994).
323. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Napoleon, 701 N.E.2d 350, 354-55
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solvent debtor may continue to deal with his or her assets in
the ordinary course, the debtor "may not give them away and
thereby put them beyond the reach of creditors." 324 Since the
Youngs were insolvent when they tithed to their church, the
problem was easily framed.325 Ordinarily, such expenditures
would be avoided and recovered for the benefit of the Youngs'
creditors. If,
however, the donations were a religious exercise,
and avoidance would "substantially" burden such exercise, the
Bankruptcy Code would have to cede to RFRA.
The Young court began its analysis of the burden caused by
avoidance by comparing two prior cases, In re Newman 326 and
In re Tessier.327 In Newman, the bankruptcy court for the district of Kansas held that the fraudulent conveyance provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code violated neither the Free Exercise
Clause nor RFRA because "recovery of fraudulent transfers has
been a basic tenet of bankruptcy law for 400 years."328

Al-

though noting that Congress could have exempted tithes from
the fraudulent conveyance statute, the Newman bankruptcy
court concluded by reasoning that Bankruptcy Code § 548 was
"sufficiently narrow" to survive a challenge under RFRA since
"[cilearly, the statute was drawn in such a way as to balance
the ability of the debtor[s] to dispose of property with the need
329
to protect unsecured creditors."
In Tessier, by contrast, the Bankruptcy Code's rules regarding Chapter 13330 reorganization plans were not considered
(Mass. 1998) (citing Jorden v. Ball, 258 N.E.2d 736 (Mass. 1970); Blumenthal
v. Blumenthal, 21 N.E.2d 244 (Mass. 1939)).
324. Id. at 355.

325. See Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 141
F.3d 854, 857 (8th Cir. 1998).
326. See Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82
F.3d 1407, 1414 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing In re Newman, 183 B.R. 239 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1995)), reh'g en bane denied, 89 F.3d 494 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted,
vacated, and remanded, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997), affd 141 F.3d 854 (8th

Cir.1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 43 (1998).
327. See In re Young, 82 F.3d at 1417 (citing In re Tessier, 190 B.R. 396
(Bankr. D. Mont. 1995)).
328. In re Newman, 183 B.R. at 251-52. Interestingly, the Newman bankruptcy court cited the Young district court, which was, after the Newman
bankruptcy court opinion, reversed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. In
re Young, 82 F.3d 1407, reh'g en banc denied, 89 F.3d 494 (8th Cir. 1996).

329. In re Newman, 183 B.R. at 252.
330. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1329 (1994). Chapter 13 is similar to Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code, in that its goal is reorganization rather than liquidation. Chapter 13 reorganizations are available only to individuals of somewhat limited means who have a regular income.
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sufficiently compelling to deny a debtor's future right to tithe
under the plan. In Tessier, a bankruptcy trustee had objected
to the debtor's proposal to tithe $100 per month under the
debtor's plan of reorganization. 33 1 Tessier overruled the trustee's objection. Citing Sherbert, the Tessier court reasoned that
compelling governmental interests are "only those interests
pertaining to survival of the republic or the physical safety of
its citizens." 332 The Tessier court acknowledged that the government had a legitimate interest in providing the debtor with
a fresh start, efficiently administering bankruptcy cases, and
protecting creditors. Yet, that court concluded, such interests
fell "short of direct national security and public safety concerns." 333 The Tessier court reasoned that these interests, although "rational, and even important," were "not sufficiently
grave to deserve the 'compelling' label when balanced against a
parishioner's free exercise of religion."334
Acknowledging that the Tessier court "arguably" used a
"narrow[er]" test than Newman, the Young court considered
Tessier "substantively similar" to the Youngs' case. 335 Thus, the
Young court concluded that "the interests advanced by the
bankruptcy system are not compelling under the RFRA." 336 If
third parties were not harmed, this conclusion would be less
controversial. But the Young court apparently believed that
331. See In re Tessier, 190 B.R. at 396. The Tessier court also found RFRA
unconstitutional. See id. at 405-07. The procedural context of Tessier was
quite different from Young or Newman, as the Tessier case involved confirmation of a plan of reorganization, under which the debtor was required to pay all
of its "projected disposable income" for three years to creditors. Id. at 397.
Charitable contributions were not considered "reasonable living expense[s],"
and are not part of the definition of "disposable income" for purposes of this
calculation. Id. at 403.
332. Id. at 405. It is not clear how the Tessier court developed this analysis.

333. Id.
334. Id. (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)). This is not
the Sherbert test. As discussed above, the "feeble" nature of Sherbert-era protection for religious liberty was far stingier to religious claimants. See supra
notes 226, 264 and accompanying text.
335. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d
1407, 1420 (8th Cir. 1996), rehg en bane denied, 89 F.3d 494 (8th Cir. 1996),
cert. granted,vacated, and remanded, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997), affd 141 F.3d 854
(8th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 43 (1998). As discussed below, it could
be argued, contra the Young court, that Tessier was not "substantively similar"
to the Youngs' case since, among other reasons, the Tessier trustee's success
would directly prevent a future religious exercise, whereas the Youngs' trustee
was merely seeking to undo that which the Youngs' had already done. See id.
336. Id.
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harm to third parties caused by religious exercise is irrelevant.
It was not even considered, even though RFRA, by its terms,
requires courts to balance the burden on religion against the
"compelling" (and least restrictively implemented) governmental interest.3 37 Unless one believes RFRA is more protective of
religious liberty than Sherbert and Yoder-a position belied by
the terms of the statute-the Eighth Circuit should at least
have considered the harm caused. Specifically, "strong" protection under Sherbert and Yoder should have led the Young court
to consider whether the "private" repayment rights of creditors
were as "compelling" as the state's interest in, for example, requiring religious actors to pay taxes 338 or to participate in the
339
social security system.
Courts and commentators 340 have wrestled with the question whether contributions to churches by insolvent donors are
337. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (1994).
338. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); see also
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 385-92
(1990).
339. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254-61 (1982); see also Keating,supra note 1, at 1049.
340. See generally Kathleen M. Cerne, Honor Thy Creditors?:The Religious
Debtor's ConstitutionalConflict with Section 1325(b), 98 COM. L.J. 257 (1993);
Michael M. Duclos, A Debtor's Right to Tithe in Bankruptcy Under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 11 BANKR. DEv. J. 665 (1995); Nicholas A.
Franke, Servitude Without Solvency: The Debtor'sRight to Continue Religious
ContributionsDuringa Chapter13 RehabilitationPlan, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 183
(1988); Keating, supra note 1; Lipson, supra note 134; Leonard J. Long, Religious Exercise as Credit Risk, 10 BANKR. DEV. J. 119 (1993-1994); Richard
Collin Mangrum, Tithing, Bankruptcy and the Conflict Between Religious
Freedom and Creditor'sInterests, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 815 (1999); Bruce W.
Megard, Jr., Tithing and FraudulentTransfers in Bankruptcy: Confirming a
Trustee's Power to Avoid the Tithe After City of Boerne v. Flores, 71 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 413 (1997); Donald R. Price & Mark C. Rahdert, Distributingthe
First Fruits: Statutory and ConstitutionalImplications of Tithing in Bankruptcy, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853 (1993); Todd J. Zywicki, Rewrite the Bankruptcy Laws, Not the Scriptures: Protecting a Bankruptcy Debtor's Right to
Tithe, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1223; Troy S. Anderson, Comment, Christians v.
Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young): Why Would "Christians"Take
Money Out of the Church Offering Plate?, 4 REGENT U. L. REV. 177 (1994);
Steven Hopkins, Comment, Is God a PreferredCreditor? Tithing as an Avoidable Transfer in Chapter7 Bankruptcies, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1139 (1995); Carol
Koenig, Comment, To Tithe or Not to Tithe: The Constitutionalityof Tithing in
a Chapter13 Bankruptcy Budget, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1231 (1992); Bruce
Edward Kosub & Susan K. Thompson, Note, The Religious Debtor's Conviction
to Tithe as the Price of a Chapter 13 Discharge, 66 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1988);
Aric D. Martin, Comment, Chapter 13 and the Tithe: Is God a Creditor?,56
OHIO ST. L. REV. 307 (1995); Brian Wildermuth, Note, In re Lee: Tithing as
Grounds for Dismissal Under Section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 26 U.
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constructive fraudulent conveyances and, if so, whether avoiding and recovering the contributions violates the religious liberty of the donor or the church. To some extent, the issue has
been rendered academic by the Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, which creates a broad exemption from recovery for charitable contributions generally
(defined to include more than simply religious contributions)
not in excess of 15% of the gross annual income of the debtor
34 1
for the year in which the transfer was made.
Yet Young remains the law, and its indifference to thirdparty harm is troubling. The Supreme Court has never recognized a free exercise exemption that would relieve the Youngs
of their fiduciary duties or impair the contractual rights of their
creditors. 342 It is beyond dispute that financially impaired
debtors such as the Youngs are fiduciaries of their creditors
under the "trust fund doctrine." 343 As fiduciaries, insolvent
debtors must exercise the "due care, diligence and skill both as
to affirmative and negative duties ...required of... 'an ordinarily prudent man in the conduct of his private affairs under
similar circumstances and with a similar object in view."' 3 "
More specifically, these fiduciary duties include the obligations
not to "waste" assets or to favor "insiders" over other creditors. 345 This fiduciary duty may explain the equitable maxim
TOL. L. REv. 725 (1995).
341. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1994). Although beyond the scope of this Article, the Charitable Protections Act has much to commend it and raises some
interesting questions of its own. In expanding the category of protected transactions beyond solely those involving religion, the drafters wisely avoided the
Establishment Clause problem that may have arisen by "promoting" religion.
See Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 1 (1989). The Charitable Protec-'
tions Act suggests, however, by negative inference, that RFRA and Young may
not have been strong enough to protect the insolvent religious donor. If, as I
argue, Sherbert was not terribly protective of religious liberty in fact, and
should not have been used to protect the donations in Young, the clear and
discrete carve-out of the Charitable Protections Act appears to be an improvement. Whether Congress should have the power to interfere with state
fraudulent conveyance laws, as imported by § 544 of the Bankruptcy Code is,
however, another matter, left for further analysis. See generally City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (striking the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 as applied to a state zoning law).
342. See Keating, supra note 1, at 1049; Lipson, supra note 134, at 303.
343. See, e.g., In re Mortgageamerica Corp., 714 F.2d 1266, 1268-72 (5th
Cir. 1983); Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435, 436-38 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No.
17,944).
344. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Weaver, 680 F.2d 451, 461 (6th Cir. 1982);
see also In re Johnson, 518 F.2d 246, 251 (10th Cir. 1975).
345. See Amussen v. Quaker City Corp., 156 A. 180, 182 (Del. 1931); Geyer
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often invoked in fraudulent conveyance litigations, "be just before you are generous." 346 In one sense, therefore, the Youngs
were trustees for their creditors; they were not donating their
own money, but the funds held for the benefit of their creditors .347
While the Youngs' creditors may have enjoyed (and been
deprived of) private fiduciary and contractual rights, it is not
clear that they enjoyed a property right in the Youngs' assets.
One's instinct is to say that they did not. They did not, for example, have the possessory rights of a lien creditor. Yet recent
precedent suggests that the Court views "property" as an expanding category of rights and interests, one that protects the
"reasonable investment-backed expectations" of market participants.3 48 In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 349 for example, four
Justices 350 concluded for the first time that federally imposed
liability for employment benefits violated the Takings
Clause. 351 The obligation to fund employee benefits under the
Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992,352 the Eastern plurality reasoned, was a taking because the coal company
v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784, 791 (Del. Ch. 1992).
346. Rudy v. Austin, 19 S.W. 111, 113 (Ark. 1892). This equitable maxim is
widely cited by courts in the context of fraudulent conveyances. See, e.g., Boston Trading Group, Inc. v. Burnazos, 835 F.2d 1504, 1508 (1st Cir. 1987) (interpreting Massachusetts law); Mercantile Natl Bank v. Aldridge, 210 S.E.2d
791, 793 (Ga. 1974); Birney v. Solomon, 181 N.E. 318, 320 (Ill. 1932); First
Nat'l Bank v. Frescoln Farms, Ltd., 430 N.W. 2d 432, 436 (Iowa 1988); Lutherville Supply & Equip. Co. v. Dimon, 192 A.2d 496, 498 (Md. 1963);
Lafayette Fin. Corp. v. Cunningham, 143 A.2d 700, 702 (R.I. 1958); Durham v.
Blackard, 438 S.E.2d 259, 263 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993); Walker v. Loring, 36 S.W.
246, 247 (Tex. 1896); Brinhall v. Grow, 480 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1971).
347. See, e.g., In re MortgageamericaCorp., 714 F.2d at 1266; Dummer, 30
F. Cas. at 435; ; see also Keating, supra note 1, at 1048 (discussing "externalities" created by denying recovery of tithes that are fraudulent conveyances);
cf Zywicki, supra note 340, at 1268 (claiming, without support, that there is
"no basis" for the foregoing proposition).
348. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
349. 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (plurality opinion).
350. See id. Justice O'Connor delivered an opinion in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices Thomas and Scalia joined.
351. EasternEnters., 524 U.S. at 504. The Takings Clause provides: "[Nior
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause applies to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
352. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-9722 (1994 & Supp. II 1997). This Act would have
required a company that had long since left the business of coal mining to pay
future health benefits for employees (and their dependents) who had been employed by the company when it engaged in coal mining.

656

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:589

had a "property right" in its "reasonable investment-backed expectations" about the level of benefits it had agreed to provide
to its former employees announced in Kaiser Aetna v. United
States. 353
If one agrees with Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Thomas
and Scalia, one may conclude that Young effected a taking. Did
RFRA not, as applied in Young, defeat the "reasonable investment-backed expectations" of the Youngs' creditors? The
Youngs' creditors probably understood that debtors like the
Youngs could declare bankruptcy, a result of which would be a
modest, fractional distribution to creditors, followed by a discharge of the debtors' debts. Yet such creditors would also expect that a bankruptcy trustee would be able to use the avoiding powers of the Bankruptcy Code (e.g., the constructive
fraudulent conveyance provisions) to recover transfers not supported by consideration (e.g., the Youngs' tithe). Why RFRA
should defeat that expectation is unclear. Like Calder v. Bull,
on which the Eastern Enterprises plurality relied for its Takings Clause analysis, one may conclude that "[it is against all
reason and justice' to presume that the legislature has been entrusted with the power to enact 'a law that takes property from
A and gives it to B.' 354 Yet-if one believes the Youngs' creditors had a reasonable investment-backed expectation in repayment-that is what RFRA did.
It is certainly possible that the Youngs' creditors in fact
suffered little from this application of RFRA. Indeed, given the
amounts in question, it is unlikely that they suffered any
meaningful economic harm.355 The problem, however, is the
353. See Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 523 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)). KaiserAetna held that a court confronting a
regulatory takings problem should conduct an "essentially ad hoc, factual inquir[y]" that focuses on (i)the "economic impact of the regulation," (ii) the
regulation's "interference with reasonable investment backed expectations,"
and (iii) the "character of the governmental action." KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at
175.
Justice Kennedy, in partial dissent, decried this extraordinary conclusion.
The "constant limitation" of the Court's Takings Clause analysis, he wrote,
"has been that in all cases where the regulatory taking analysis has been employed, a specific property right or interest has been at stake." Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 541 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment; dissenting in
part). Here, Justice Kennedy pointed out, the Coal Act "does not operate upon
or alter an identified property interest." Id. at 540.

354. 524 U.S. at 523 (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388
(1798)).
355. See, e.g., Brief of Appellant on Remand from the Supreme Court of the
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next case based on the rule of Young. Should creditors scrutinize the credit-worthiness of religious actors more carefully
than others, in order that they may hedge against this risk?356
What makes this kind of third-party harm tolerable, when so
many others-an out-and-out taking of property, for exampleare intolerable? One would never know from reading Young.
2. Thomas
The (now withdrawn) Thomas opinion 357 commits the same
sins as Young. After concluding summarily that leasing property was a religious exercise, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Thomas that the "strong" protection of Smith's
"hybrid rights" exception exempted religious landlords from
compliance with Alaska's fair housing law.358 While such an

exemption may be permissible in certain cases, it is difficult to
understand why the Court of Appeals failed even to consider
the harm to unmarried couples its holding would cause.
Rather, like Young, the Thomas court appeared to believe that
balancing harms was no longer relevant to religious liberty
analysis.
The Thomas court began its "hybrid rights" analysis by distinguishing three general approaches to the hybrid rights
problem. 359 Courts could require religious liberty claimants to
United States at 27, Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re
Young), 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998) (No. 93-2267 MNMI) (citing Michael J.
Herbert & Domenic E. Pacetti, Down and Out in Richmond, Virginia: The Distributionof Assets in Chapter7 Bankruptcy Proceedings Closed During 19841987, 22 U. RICH.L. REV. 303, 310-11 & n.30 (1988)) (suggesting that because
"some 96% of Chapter 7 bankruptcies are no-asset cases," creditors would suffer little harm by permitting religious debtors to tithe).
356. While that may be rational creditor behavior, it would likely violate
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, which prohibits discriminating in the extension of credit based on such factors. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1994) ("It
shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with
respect to any aspect of a credit transaction.., on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status. ..").
357. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.
1999), opinion withdrawn on grant of reh'g by Thomas v. Anchorage Equal
Rights Comm'n, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999).
358. Id. at 711, 717.
359. Id. at 703. The court gave some attention to the question whether hybrid rights exist. Because "Smith did not overrule Cantwell, Murdock, Follett
and Yoder," the court concluded that "[we] are not at liberty to ignore them."
Id. Although beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that it is fundamentally unclear whether Smith was simply recognizinga pattern in religious jurisprudence or creating a new rule. Cf. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 562 (1997) (acknowledging the hybrid rights exception; suggesting
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show that the non-free exercise right was (i) merely "implicated,"3 60 or (ii) merely "colorable," 361 or (iii) "independently viable."3 62 The Thomas court recognized that a rule of "implication" would be too broad: "Government action will almost
always 'implicate' a host of constitutional rights, even though it
does not seriously threaten, much less violate, any of them."363
Yet requiring the "other" right to be "independently viable"
would render the Free Exercise Clause component of the claim
irrelevant.3 64 According to the Thomas court, the middle
path-a "colorable-claim standard"--would'be "neither too lax
nor too strict, but 'just right.' 3 65
The Thomas court acknowledged that a "colorable claim"
standard is nevertheless hard to define. The standard will "require courts reviewing free exercise claims to make difficult,
qualitative, case-by-case judgments regarding the strength of
companion-claim arguments."366 Here, the court of appeals
reasoned, the "'center of gravity' deduced from the many ways
in which claims are considered "colorable" in other contexts resembles the test for a preliminary injunction: "In order to trigger strict scrutiny," the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded, "a hybrid-rights plaintiff must show a 'fair
that hybrid rights are invoked merely by "implicating" another right).
360. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 567 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring). The district court in Thomas, in an
unpublished decision, took the view that the landlords had only to show that
other rights-property or speech-were "implicated" to be exempt from
Alaska's fair housing statutes. See Thomas, 165 F.3d at 703 (quoting the district court opinion).
361. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 703; see also Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998).
362. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 703. Cf. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d
455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that a proper hybrid rights claims must be
"independently viable"); Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d
525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995).
363. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 705.
364. "[Ellse the Free Exercise Clause itself vanishes." Id. at 704 (parentheses omitted) (citing Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 567 (Souter, J., concurring)).
365. 165 F.3d at 707.
[We believe that the best understanding of Smith actually suggests
an approach to hybrid-rights claims that falls somewhere between the
two extremes marked out by Justice Souter [in Lukumi]. That is to
say, an individual claiming to be within the hybrid-rights exception
may not rest upon a bald assertion that a companion right exists or
the fact that a companion right is somehow "'implicated'" by a government policy.
Id. at 705.
366. Id. at 705.
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probability'-a 'likelihood'-of success on the merits of his companion claim."367 Thus, according to the Ninth Circuit, it apwould pass muster in a
pears that a "hybrid right" is one that368
injunction.
preliminary
a
for
complaint
The Thomas landlords claimed that one of their companion
claims arose under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. This, they argued, gave them the constitutional right to
exclude others from their property. The Ninth Circuit agreed.
But in doing so, the court stretched both its own definition of
what constitutes a colorable claim for this purpose and existing
Takings Clause jurisprudence. The Thomas court recognized
that Takings Clause cases generally fall into one of two categories: (i) where the government authorizes a physical occupation
of property (or actually takes title), the Takings Clause generally requires compensation; 369 and (ii) where the government
merely regulates the use of property, compensation is required
only if considerations such as the purpose of the regulation or
the extent to which it deprives the owner of the economic use of
the property suggest that the regulation has unfairly singled
bear a burden that should be borne
out the property owner to
370
whole.
a
as
public
the
by
While the Alaska fair housing statutes may not have effected a "permanent physical occupation" under cases such as
Yee v. City of Escondido,37' the Ninth Circuit concluded that

367. Id. at 706.
368. If this is the standard, it raises two questions. First, how is it less
strict than the "independently viable" standard? At least intuitively, it would
appear the standards are quite similar. Second, and as discussed below, it
would appear that the court of appeals did not actually use this stricter test as
to the companion property claim. Instead, the court used the "essentially ad
hoe" set of tests announced in Kaiser Aetna. See Thomas, 165 F.3d at 708
(citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)). It is not clear
how, short of ipse dixit, one can show a "likelihood of success" on "ad hoc"

merits.
369. See id. at 709 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982)).
370. See id. at 708 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 123-25 (1978)).
371. 503 U.S. 519, 531 (1992) (concluding that because a California mobilehome park had "voluntarily open[ed] [its] property to occupation by others, [it
could not] assert a per se right to compensation based on their inability to exclude particular individuals"). In Yee, the Supreme Court held that the
Escondido rent control ordinance did not constitute a permanent physical occupation. See id. at 539. In so doing, the Court did not conduct a regulatory
takings analysis. See id. at 537-39.
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they nevertheless effected a "'regulatory taking.' 372 Applying
the Supreme Court's three-part Kaiser Aetna test for a regulatory taking, the Thomas court reasoned that a reviewing court
must undertake an "'essentially ad hoc, factual inquir[y]' 373 involving three factors: "(1) the economic impact of the regulation
on the claimant, (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 374
expectations, and (3)
the character of the governmental action."
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that Alaska's fair housing
statutes did not interfere with the landlords' reasonable "investment-backed expectations," since "[clommon sense would
appear to dictate [that a] rule requiring a landlord to rent to a
certain class of otherwise disqualified people would enlarge the
pool of prospective renters, and thus perhaps increase-but certainly not decrease-his bottom line."375 Yet according to the
Ninth Circuit the "'bottom line' is not the sole measure of a successful Takings Clause claim."376 Citing Loretto v. Teleprompter, the court reasoned that a permanent physical occupation
would be a taking377even if the government action improved the
value of property.
The Thomas court went on to reason that the landlords
fared better under the "'character-of-regulation" prong of the
regulatory takings analysis. 378 Quoting Penn Central, the
Ninth Circuit noted that "[a] "taking" may more readily be
found when the interference with property can be characterized
as a physical invasion by government than when interference
arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the social good.'" 37 9 Although it acknowledged that the Alaska statutes effected no
permanent physical occupation, the Thomas court concluded
that such laws nevertheless caused a "physical invasion' of the
372. See Thomas, 165 F.3d at 708 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)).
373. Id. (quoting Kaiser,444 U.S. at 175).
374. Id. (citing Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998)).
375. Id. at 708.
376. Id. at 708-09.
377. See id. at 709 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter, 458 U.S. 419, 437 n.15
(1982)). As the dissent noted, Loretto addressed "issues squarely within the
area of physical takings, not the regulatory taking which is at issue here." Id.
at 725 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
378. Id. at 709 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
379. Id. (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124).
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landlords' property just the same."380 Thus, the Alaska fair
housing laws went381"too far'" as a regulatory taking under
Pennsylvania Coal.
It is not clear why the court concluded that the landlords
had a colorable takings claim. 382 By its own test, a "colorable"
claim for a hybrid-rights analysis turns, like a preliminary injunction claim, on showing a "fair probability'-a 'likelihood'of success on the merits."38 3 Yet if, as the court also acknowledged, a taking under Kaiser Aetna is an "'essentially ad hoc,
factual inquir[y],'" 384 how-short of ipse dixit-could the court
have concluded that the landlords would have "likely" succeeded on their takings claim? Moreover, the court's analysis
simply misreads Penn Central. Penn Central made plain the
distinction between "physical invasions," on the one hand, and
interference arising from "'some public program adjusting the
385
benefits and burdens of economic life,'" on the other hand.
The court did not explain-perhaps because it could not-how
Alaska's fair housing statutes were the former rather than the
latter.
More generally, as the dissent noted, the court confused
the two strands of takings analysis, the permanent physical occupation versus regulatory taking.386 According to the dissent,
"the very heart of the regulatory takings doctrine is that the
regulation has gone 'too far' by depriving the owner of the 'economically beneficial and productive use of land."' 38 7 Here, of
380. Id.
381. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922)).
382. Thomas also concluded that the landlords enjoyed a "hybrid" right under the Speech Clause because the Alaska statutes forbade the landlords from
making "written or oral inquiry" into the marital status of a prospective tenant. Id. at 710. Analysis of that component of Thomas is beyond the scope of
this Article. One would imagine, however, that the Ninth Circuit's liberal approach to commercial speech precedent was no different from its creative interpretations of Takings and Religion Clause precedent. See id. at 709. The
court noted that "[there is no litmus test for distinguishing commercial from
noncommercial expression." Id. at 709. It is not clear whether Thomas turned
on the "hybrid" of religion plus property, or the "tri-brid" of religion plus property plus speech.
383. Id. at 706.
384. Id. at 708 (citation omitted).
385. Id. at 709 (quoting Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
386. See id. at 724-25 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
387. Id. at 725 (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1015 (1992)). Under Lucas, the landlords would have had to show (i)
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course, the majority acknowledged that the regulation likely
enhanced the value of the landlords' property. 388 It is simply
not clear how the Alaska statutes went "too far."
Finally, there is the question of remedy. It is well recognized that exemption from the offending statute is not the remedy if the government takes property in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. Rather, the remedy is compensation for the lost
value of the property. 389 It is perhaps no accident that the
court failed to indicate the cost of violating the statute-a $500
penalty and conviction of a misdemeanor. 390 If there were truly
a "colorable" takings claim, the remedy would be to exempt the
landlords from the $500 penalty, not to declare the law inappli39
cable to them. '
After concluding that Alaska's fair housing statutes violated a "companion" right of the landlords, the court considered
whether the statutes violated the landlords' right to free exercise of religion. Thomas began its "burdens" analysis by distinguishing Braunfeld v. Brown, which held that Jews could not
be granted a Free Exercise Clause exemption from Sunday
closing laws. 392 The mere fact that Sunday closing laws made
business more costly for Jews (who were thus forced to close
two days, rather than one) was not a "substantial burden" on
religion. According to Thomas:
[tihe burden imposed upon [the landlords] is qualitatively differentthough we think no less severe-than an imposition of increased cost:
The Alaska housing laws de facto banish [the landlords] from the
Alaska rental market altogether and force them to forsake their livelihoods as apartment owners and lessors. The laws ... do not effect a

they were deprived of "all economically beneficial use" of their property, and
(ii) that the proscribed use was not part of title to begin with. Lucas, 505 U.S.
at 1029.
388. See Thomas, 165 F.3d at 708. Enhanced value is a factor under the
regulatory takings analysis but not under the permanent physical occupation
analysis.
389. See, e.g., Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 554 (1998) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
390. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.270 (Michie 1998).
391. One may respond that the effect is the same. An exemption from the
penalty is qualitatively equivalent to exemption from the law. Yet if our concern is with the method, then the point is not the result of Thomas, but the
analysis. As with so many aspects of the case-standing, ripeness, the viability and application of the "hybrid rights" exception to Smith-the Thomas
court appears to have been overeager to reach a result at odds with established precedent.
392. See Thomas, 165 F.3d at 713 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1961)).
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mere marginal reduction in business; they put [the landlords] out of
business.393

While this sounds quite dramatic, it should be remembered
that the landlords had been engaged in this business-and presumably religious-since 1986. 394 If found "guilty," the fine
would have been $500. The statute would not have required
them to forsake their livelihoods. Moreover, "[ulntil [the landlords] filed this lawsuit, the principal agency responsible for enforcement of these measures had never even heard of them and
for good reason: no one has ever filed a complaint about their
395
rental practices."
Like Young, the problem with Thomas is less the result
than the method. Even if one does not think that this particular case goes too far, it offers absolutely no limiting principle on
the power of religious actors to harm third parties. What if, instead of unmarried couples, the landlords' religion compelled
them to decline to rent to Jews or African-Americans? What if,
as in the Watson case, religious claimants believed their religion entitled them to own chattel slaves? What if they decided
to tear down their apartments and build skyscrapers topped by
churches, in violation of applicable zoning ordinances? 396 While
others will no doubt think of more colorful horrors, 397 it is diffi398
cult to escape the conclusion that Thomas also goes "too far."
III. ON BALANCE-EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AND
SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE
The ultimate problem is not whether Young or Thomas selected or applied the correct rule, but whether rules, as such,
can ever truly resolve religious liberty disputes that pit the
rights of the religious actor against the rights of third parties.
The rights of third parties should not always defeat all claims
of religious liberty. Nor should religious liberty always defeat
the rights of third parties to be free from harm. Nor, most importantly, can anyone considering these questions in the abstract offer as an answer a categorical rule. The current morass of judge-made tests and exceptions proves the point. Few
serious students of religious liberty believe that the Court's re393. Id.
394. See id. at 724 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
395. Id. at 718. This issue goes more directly to the questions of ripeness,
justiciability and standing. On those questions, Judge Hawkins noted in dissent, "[tihe approach of the majority ought to alarm any serious student of judicial restraint." Id.
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ligious jurisprudence taken in the aggregate-from Reynolds to
Sherbert to Smith-is coherent or helpful. 399 Indeed, the rules
do not even succeed on their own terms. Young and Thomas
show that Smith has produced the very anarchy it sought to
banish.
Courts can mend the distortions of our religious liberty jurisprudence by restoring judicial balancing in competitions between religious actors and private third parties. Courts do not,
however, need to announce a new multipart test to do this.
They already have the necessary tools in equity jurisprudence.
Equity is especially useful in this context because it links judicial balancing to an expansive hunt for facts. Through equity,
judges cast a wide net to understand the parties' motives and
the harms they cause one another, and to address what the
sere formulae of "law"--as distinct from equity-would view as
irresolvable competitions of equal right. Equity offers a way to
heal the infirmities of Young and Thomas, their failure to inquire into whether the activities were religious exercises and, if
so, to balance the competing harms of enforcing the laws in
question.

396. See St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 351
(2d Cir. 1990).
397. Other horrors include church exemptions from liability for negligently
hiring priests that sexually molest parishioners, see Gibson v. Brewer, 952
S.W.2d 239, 243 (Mo. 1997), and trademark infringement laws, see Maktib
Tarighe Oveyssi Shah Maghsoudi, Inc. v. Kianfar, 179 F.3d 1244, 1246 (9th
Cir. 1999).
398. At least six state appellate courts have dealt with substantially similar facts. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 868 P.2d 301, 308
(Alaska 1994), rehg granted, withdrawn from bound volume, modified, and
reissuedper curiam, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994); Smith v. Fair Employment
& Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996); Donahue v. Fair Employment &
Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 42 (Ct. App. 1991), review grantedin banc,
825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review dismissed in banc as being improvidently
granted, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993) (not published in the official reporter); Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 242-43 (Mass. 1994) (reversing
summary judgment for the defendant-landlords under the Massachusetts constitution); McReady v. Hoffius, 593 N.W.2d 545, 545 (Mich. 1999) (TABLE,
NO. 108995, 108996) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause trumps Michigan's civil rights act); State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 10 (Minn. 1990).
399. Except, perhaps, as fodder for legal scholarship.
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A. EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE-A SOURCE OF BALANCE
Many scholars have lamented the abandonment of bal400
ancing for a variety of reasons and in a variety of contexts.
Professor Steven Smith, for example, has argued that only
"prudentialism"-a kind of ad hoc balancing-can adequately
address contests between claims of religious freedom under the
40
Free Exercise Clause and neutral laws of general application. '
Louis Henkin has argued that judicial balancing "softens the
rigors of absolutes, makes room for judgment and for sensitivity to differences of degree."40 2 The erratic nature of religious
liberty jurisprudence alone suggests that absolute or categorical rules, while important in certain contexts, simply cannot
produce adequate results when strictly applied to religious lib403
erty claims that compete with the rights of third parties.
The methods of equity-the source of a "remedy where the

law did injustice" 4°4--can help restore a more healthy balance
400. See generally Gressman & Carmella, supra note 25; Steven D. Smith,
Unprincipled Religious Freedom, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 497, 501
(1996).
401. See Smith, supra note 400, at 501-02 ("A prudential approach to religious freedom controversies would not try to find the 'correct' solution to any
particular controversy, but would instead seek to work out a relatively acceptable compromise or modus vivendi." (footnote omitted)). See generally STEVEN
D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995). Professor Smith has argued that
even before the Smith case, the Court never really "balanced" competing interests in the religious liberty context. See Smith, supra note 264, at 530-31.
Rather, as in Yoder, the Court has avoided the difficult task of balancing by
claiming that permitting a religious liberty exemption furthers, or at least
does not impair, the legislative goal in question (e.g., the schooling of children).
402. Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: ConstitutionalBalancing, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 1022, 1047 (1978).
403. See Michael C. Dorf, God and Man in the Yale Dormitories, 84 VA. L.
REV. 843, 850 (1998) (discussing new approaches to strict scrutiny-including
the "hybrid-rights" approach-and suggesting that "within a decade, federal
law will have gone from purportedly requiring religious exemptions to not requiring them, back to requiring them then back again to not requiring them,
and finally to requiring them again").
404. PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW'S CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 8 (1990). Although equity is largely foreign
to constitutional jurisprudence, it has made modest appearances in both Sherbert and Watson. In his concurrence in Sherbert, for example, Justice Stewart
suggested that a balance of equities could perhaps salvage the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 414
(1963) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[T]here are many situations where legitimate
claims under the Free Exercise Clause will run into head-on collision with the
Court's insensitive and sterile construction of the Establishment Clause."
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to religious liberty jurisprudence in claims involving third parties.4 05 The methods of equity work in "the interstices of
law,"40 6 offering ways to navigate between otherwise acceptable
"'general statements"'4 07 or categories of law that would lead to
unjust results. Although equity is hardly perfect-unchecked
judicial discretion may lead to anarchy, impermissible discrimination, etc.-it at least offers two concrete benefits over
current jurisprudence involving disputes between religious actors and third parties: (i) an established body of law (largely involving competing, legitimate property claims) under the rubric
of the "balance of equities," and (ii) an established way to "engage in [a] wide-ranging examination of factual issues behind
40 8
the pleadings."
Professor Peter Hoffer has thoughtfully explored the constitutional uses of equity jurisprudence, arising chiefly from
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 40 9 the "greatest 'equity'
suit in our country's history, perhaps in the history of equity."4 10 According to Professor Hoffer, the equitable principles
enunciated in Brown, which led to the conclusion that federal
courts should insure school desegregation with "all deliberate
speed,"411 teach that "equity [is] an approach to law, including

(footnote omitted)). In Watson, the Court noted that the interpretation of a
trust benefiting a church would result in no entanglement with religion because the "general doctrine... of equity as to charities.., seems equally applicable to ecclesiastical matters." Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679,
723 (1871).
405. "Methods" exclude, for purposes of this Article, equitable remedies.
While equitable remedies may (or may not) be appropriate in religious liberty
disputes, the topic is so broad as to be well beyond the scope of this Article. If
one views equitable remedies as all judicial action other than an award of
money damages, cf Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 925 (1988) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (noting that "damages after the fact are considered an 'adequate
remedy' in all but the most extraordinary cases"), one could conclude that all
religious liberty exemptions are a species of equitable remedy. Granting a religious liberty exemption is, in form and effect, an injunction against the ability of the state (or third party) to enforce an otherwise valid right or remedy.
See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103
HARv. L. REv. 687, 742-45 (1990) (discussing injunctions against unlawful
speech and counterinjunctions against "prior restraint").
406. HOFFER, supra note 404, at 8.
407. Id. (quoting ARISTOTLE, NIcHOMAcHEAN ETmics 313-17 (H. Rockham
ed., 1934)).
408. Id. at 161-62.
409. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
410. HOFFER, supra note 404, at 4.
411. 349 U.S. at 301 (1955).

2000]

ON BALANCE

667

constitutional law, based on doing justice for all concerned."4 12
Professor Hoffer locates several species of equity, the most important of
which for purposes of this Article is the "balance of
41 3
equity."
The balance of equity in United States jurisprudence came
in two waves. 4 14 In the first, post-Civil War courts such as the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Richard's Appeal, used the
balance of equity to conclude that the cost of granting a nuisance injunction to a small landowner harmed by a large
neighboring factory did not justify the cost to the factory of a
court-ordered shut down. 4 15 Although the court found that the
smokestack may have caused a nuisance, the court remanded
the case for the chancellor in equity to "consider whether he
would not do a greater injury by enjoining than would result
from refusing, and leaving [the petitioner] to his redress at the
hands of a court and jury."4 16 "It is elementary law," the court
is never of right, as a judgreasoned, "that in equity a decree
4 17
ment at law is, but of grace."
The second wave of balance of equity cases was more "supple,"41 8 reflecting a broad "contextual analysis" of the competing
claims of the parties. 419 Perhaps reflecting progressive political
trends of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this
second wave of cases enabled courts to engage in "wide-ranging
examination of the factual issues behind the pleadings ... invit[ing] counsel for both sides to produce mountains of detail to
sustain the plaintiffs prediction of damage to come and the defendant's reckoning of future economic losses."420 Thus, in
412. HOFFER, supra note 404, at 7. Other scholars have hinted at the possibility that equity may be appropriate in the religious liberty context. See
generally Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Free Exercise of Religion After Smith
and Boerne: Chartinga Middle Course, 68 MISS. L.J. 105, 110 (1998) ("The
number of relevant factors to be considered under a Constitution dedicated to
protecting both equality and free exercise of religion is such that any fair effort
to achieve a balanced result requires a court to act virtually as a court of equity."); Volokh, supra note 222, at 1465 (arguing that RFRA-type laws create a
"common-law exemption model" under which exemption decisions are initially
made by courts and are ultimately revisable by legislatures).
413. See HOFFER, supra note 404, at 147-79.
414. See id. at 147, 157.
415. See id. at 152 (citing Richard's Appeal, 57 Pa. 105 (1868)).
416. Richard'sAppeal, 57 Pa. at 113-114.
417. Id. at 113.
418. HOFFER, supra note 404, at 147.
419. Id. at 157.
420. Id. at 161-62.
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Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper, for example, the New York
Court of Appeals in 1913 carefully balanced the costs to lower
riparian owners whose farms were being destroyed by waste
from an upstream paper mill against the losses attending the
upstream mill owner, who had hundreds of employees and had
made substantial investments in the plant.421 These balance of
equity cases "allowed judges to manage appropriate solutions to
otherwise intractable problems."422 It became a method of approaching "clash[es] of equal rights."423
Disputes between religious actors and third parties, such
as those in Young or Thomas, are often clashes of "equal
rights." The Youngs' bankruptcy trustee had a legitimate right
to recover payments that were not supported by adequate consideration. Alaska's legislature had a legitimate interest in
eliminating housing discrimination. Yet if donating money or
leasing real property were religious exercises in those cases,
the Youngs and the landlords would have had equally legitimate claims to be exempt from those otherwise legitimate laws.
The problem with Young and Thomas is the failure to examine
and consider facts, the failure to determine whether these activities were religious exercises and if so, whether the harm to
third parties of religious exercise outweighed the harm of injunction.
It is not enough, however, to say that equity simply provides a method for resolving disputes. One must also say why
it is a better method than those currently in play. It is, for four
reasons. First, if we take the anxiety of entanglement seriously, then we must recognize that courts face an exquisite dilemma whenever they attempt to resolve competitions between
religious actors and third parties. Not only do such disputes
involve "equal" claims of right, but they often involve rights
that are very important. Indeed, if the deep deference of Young
and Thomas is the rule, and religious exercise is always what
the religious claimant says it is, courts will, in such contests,
always risk arbitrating competing claims of religious doctrine.
Equity provides a well-established basis for courts to inquire
independently into the nature of conduct to determine whether
it is, in fact, religious exercise or not. A little independent scrutiny can go a long way.
421. 101 N.E. 805, 805 (N.Y. 1913).
422. HOFFER supra note 404, at 171 (citing W. Keeton & C. Morris, Note,
Balancingthe Equities, 18 TEX. L. REV. 412, 416 (1940)).
423. Id. at 153.
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Second, legal preferences for a religious actor or group to
the claims of private individuals constitute the most toxic form
of establishment. 424 Such preferences will place courts in the
untenable position of conducting the heresy trials they fear.
While "neutrality" is a term frequently used but little understood in religious liberty jurisprudence, it at least has aspirational value. The methods of equity give courts a way to manifest this aspiration. 425 Equity tends toward neutrality.
Third, the anxiety of anarchy counsels that we do not permit individuals to become laws "unto themselves" because, in
doing so, they may hurt others. Yet contests involving truly
"equivalent" rights designed to prevent such harms cannot be
resolved by a rule of law. Instead, courts should realistically
acknowledge that competing claims of religious actors and third
parties can best be resolved on the equities of each case. While
this method is not without its risks-it requires us to trust our
judges-it reflects the complex, post-formalist world in which
426
we live.
Fourth, equity enables courts, religious actors and third
parties to take one another seriously. Young and Thomas may
have been victories for the religious actors in those cases. But
the methods of those cases-deep deference without balancing
harms-bespeak judicial indifference to the claims of religious
actors, third parties and courts. The methods of equity, by contrast, enable litigants to shed the lifeless forms of religious liberty jurisprudence, and to state their cases in plain terms.
Courts will have little choice but to respond with equal sobriety. While Solomonic decisions may not always result, even
losing parties are more likely to accept defeat if they believe
their case has been heard. Moreover, equity can enable future
courts to determine whether an activity is an exercise of relig424. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-47 (1982) (using the Establishment Clause to strike down solicitation regulations as they applied to
the Unification Church because the regulations preferred more traditional religions).
425. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 212, at 994 (noting the "aspirational'if not the decisional-value of "neutrality").
426. For more general discussions of legal realism in other contexts, see
generally Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J.
1037 (1961), and Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). For a discussion of the benefits and
burdens of balancing versus categorical, or "rule" based judging, see Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Post.LiberalJudging: The Roles of Categorizationand Balancing,
63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 294 (1992), who argues that neither approach should
govern in all disputes.
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ion, and how to balance the harm (to religious actors) of forbidding the activity against the harm (to third parties) of permitting it. Equity will enable courts to do more than apply brittle
rules to supple problems.

B. SUBSTANTIVE CRITERIA-HOW To BALANCE
To learn how to balance harms, courts will first have to
figure out what they are balancing. Courts will therefore first
have to consider seriously whether an activity is a religious exercise, an analysis notably absent from Young and Thomas.
Defining religious exercise is properly a delicate judicial task.
Courts should therefore define religion contextually, in light of
the effect such a definition will have on the parties concerned.
Some courts in some cases have already done so. Thus it is
hard to say the Alamo court erred in concluding that running
service stations was not, in fact, a religious exercise. Alamo
succeeded because it defined "religious exercise" for a particular purpose in a particular context. It may be the case that
someday we will, as a society, view running service stations as
a religious exercise. Today, however, we do not take that claim
seriously because so few people engaged in the activity would
say the activity is a religious exercise and because the harm to
third parties is fairly clear.
Second, courts should seriously consider whether, and if so,
how, third parties are affected by a religious exercise. To do
this, they will have to determine, in part, whether third parties
are even present. Many of the most troubling religious liberty
decisions, such as Reynolds 427 and Smith,428 are disturbing precisely because they failed to do this. Instead they granted the
state enormous and intrusive power without recognizing that
the manner in which church members marry, or whether
church members ingest an obscure but nevertheless illegal
hallucinogen, have little effect on third parties. As Watson
teaches, the state as abstraction should have precious few powers to interfere with the internal activities of religious organizations.429 But as one crosses the boundary from internal to external-as third parties appear--one should recognize a
427. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). As discussed
above, Reynolds held that criminal laws against polygamy could be applied to
Mormons. See id. at 166.
428. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S 872, 885 (1990) (holding that
peyote worship could be criminalized).
429. See supra text accompanying notes 55-77.
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legitimate state interest in regulation or prohibition. Distinguishing "internal" from "external" is not easy, but the contractual principles discussed above, offer a method of doing so.
How does this play out in legal terms? The burdens of
proof and persuasion should follow the presence of third parties. Where the state cannot show that a religious exercise will
harm third parties, it should bear the burden of strict or
heightened scrutiny. Such scrutiny should not be "feeble" but
harsh. Unless we agree that Reynolds and Smith are correct as
written-a position with few takers-we should recognize that
the state has few legitimate interests in internal church matters. The thumb should rest on the scales in favor of religious
actors in inverse proportion to the presence of third parties.
However, where religious exercise harms third parties-because, for example, it reduces returns to creditors, or sanctions
marital-status discrimination-the scale should be evenly set.
Religious actors should not enjoy the presumptive force of strict
scrutiny, however derived. Courts should, in such contests, do
the hard work of determining whether the conduct really is a
religious exercise and if so, whether it is of sufficient importance to warrant an exemption.
Courts that take their jobs seriously should not assume
that evenly set scales always result in a loss to the religious
liberty claimant. So viewed, Young would come out the same.
Creditors did suffer modest harm, but that harm seems insignificant when compared to the religious significance of tithing
to the Youngs. Thomas, by similar reasoning, would not. It is
difficult to argue that being a landlord was a religious exercise,
or that the choice really imposed on the landlords was "untenable." At worst, as in Braunfeld, the landlords would bear the
same cost (a fine) that anyone else violating the law would
bear.
Some may object that equity, with its emphasis on balancing, is inappropriate because the Free Exercise Clause, like
all of the Constitution, is supreme and categorical law. 430
While such a reading may be appropriate when the state alone
is involved, the presence of third parties should change the
analysis. Trying to impose bright-line tests in religious liberty
contests involving third parties seems a failed endeavor. Thus,
430. See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak From Times to Time:
FirstAmendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL.
L. REV. 935, 939 (1968) ("[Aid hoc balancing... means that there is no rule to
be applied, but only interests to be weighed.").
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the erratic nature of Sherbert-era precedent makes one question how supreme or categorical the Free Exercise Clause really
was, even at its apex. It seems unrealistic, at least, and perhaps even dangerous, to demand absolutism in contests between claims of religious liberty and third-party harm.
Others may object that leaving balancing to courts exposes
religious actors, especially adherents of minority or foreign religions, to discrimination. There is clearly some merit in this
concern. It would appear that adherents of minority religions-including Jews-have never won a free exercise exemption from a generally applicable law before the Supreme Court.
A cynic might say that the real difference between Braunfeld
and Sherbert is sectarian, not legal. Christians sometimes win;
Jews and Native Americans always lose. Yet this anxiety-the
anxiety of entanglement-cannot be so strong as to rule religious liberty jurisprudence. It must be balanced against the
anxiety of anarchy. Only by balancing these anxieties can we
hope to develop an expansive and fair body of religious liberty
jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
We maintain ordered religious liberty through two competing anxieties, entanglement and anarchy. These anxieties
can and should be balanced against one another, much as the
competing claims of religious actors and third parties may be
balanced one against the other. Through these anxieties,
judges recognize the many competing constitutional and institutional values embodied in the religion clauses. One such
value should be respect for third parties. While protecting
third parties should not be the only, or necessarily the most
important, value in our religious liberty jurisprudence, it has
had-and should continue to have-an important role.
The Young and Thomas decisions fail methodologically because they ignore the problem of third-party harm in defining
the scope of religious liberty exemptions. They abdicate the judicial duty to scrutinize independently the claim of religious
exercise when third parties are at risk, and they engage in little or no balancing of harms. The rehearing of the Thomas case
creates an important opportunity to address these shortcomings, perhaps through the use of equity jurisprudence. Respect
for religious actors, third parties and the law require more sober and balanced decisions than have been seen so far.

